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1853 
THE IMMORTAL ACCUSATION 
Lindsey Webb* 
Abstract: In the American criminal justice system, accusations have eternal life. 
Prosecutors, judges, and prison officials regularly consider dismissed charges and even prior 
acquittals in the defendant’s criminal history when making decisions ranging from the filing 
of charges to the imposition of punishment. This Article argues that the criminal justice 
system’s reliance on “accusation evidence” should be understood as furthering that system’s 
larger allegiance to attaining and preserving findings of guilt. 
Once the government obtains a guilty plea or verdict, appellate courts rarely overturn 
convictions based on concerns about the accuracy of the conviction; indeed, post-conviction 
review procedures often are structured to prevent meaningful consideration of innocence 
claims. Appellate courts will eventually cease reconsideration of the conviction altogether, 
even, in many cases, where legitimate questions about the defendant’s guilt remain. But 
while convictions are eventually laid to rest, accusations that do not result in convictions can 
be reconsidered forever, in a variety of contexts, by a variety of government actors, applying 
low or non-existent standards of proof. Once guilt is obtained, the system aims to preserve it; 
if guilt is eluded, the system will pursue it. 
This Article begins by reviewing the ways in which the criminal justice system seeks to 
obtain and maintain convictions. It then discusses the criminal justice system’s reliance on 
accusation evidence, identifying how uncertainty about the defendant’s culpability in the 
absence of a conviction drives decision makers to reconsider that outcome and replace it with 
their own determinations of guilt. It goes on to contrast the systemic reconsideration of 
convictions with the reconsideration of charges for which no conviction was obtained, using 
the doctrine of finality as a comparison point. Based on this analysis, it argues that the 
criminal justice system is structured to obtain and preserve findings of guilt, even if doing so 
does not advance the pursuit of truth or the conviction of the culpable. This Article then 
examines the implications of the systemic dedication to the pursuit and preservation of guilt, 
and suggests ways in which it might, and should, be dismantled. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The criminal justice system frequently relies on what this Article will 
call “accusation evidence,” that is, evidence of criminal conduct for 
which a person was once formally accused and subjected to criminal 
prosecution, but for which the defendant was not convicted. Prosecutors, 
judges, and prison officials regularly consider dismissed charges and 
even prior acquittals in the defendant’s criminal history when making 
decisions ranging from what new charges should be filed against him
1
 to 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. B.A., Wesleyan University; 
J.D., Stanford Law School; LLM, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Rashmi Goel, 
Chris Lasch, Susannah Pollvogt, Nantiya Ruan, Robin Walker Sterling, and participants in the 
Works in Progress session of the AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education for providing 
feedback on this Article. I am also indebted to a group of outstanding research assistants: Amanda 
Essex, Michael LaGarde, and Kacie Mulhern, with special thanks to Anne Bingert and Amelia 
Messegee for their substantial and meaningful research contributions. 
1. The number of women convicted of crimes has risen dramatically in the last thirty years. See, 
e.g., WOMEN’S PRISON ASS’N, QUICK FACTS: WOMEN & CRIMINAL JUSTICE – 2009 (2009), 
http://www.wpaonline.org/wpaassets/Quick_Facts_Women_and_CJ_2009_rebrand.pdf (“The 
female prison population grew by 832% from 1977 to 2007.”). Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
persons arrested in the United States are male. “Over 74 percent (74.1) of the persons arrested in the 
nation during 2011 were males.” Crime in the United States 2011: Persons Arrested, FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-
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what punishment is merited if a conviction is obtained. The reliance on 
unproven accusations is generally justified by reference to lingering 
questions regarding the defendant’s actual culpability when a case 
results in a dismissal or acquittal, and thus by the search for truth. This 
Article argues that the reliance on accusation evidence is more 
accurately understood as part of the criminal justice system’s larger 
allegiance to obtaining and preserving findings of guilt. 
The criminal justice system’s widespread reliance on accusation 
evidence highlights the sharp contrast between the ways in which the 
system handles the reconsideration of cases that resulted in a conviction 
and those that did not. Once the state obtains a guilty plea or verdict, 
appellate courts rarely overturn convictions based on concerns about the 
accuracy of the conviction; indeed, post-conviction review procedures 
often are structured to prevent meaningful consideration of innocence 
claims. Appellate courts will eventually cease reconsideration of the 
conviction altogether, even, in many cases, where legitimate questions 
about the defendant’s guilt remain. When a criminal accusation does not 
result in a conviction, however, it can be reconsidered forever, in a 
variety of contexts, by a variety of government actors, applying low or 
no standards of proof, in search of the guilt for which the accused person 
may have escaped justice in the past. 
Further, there are few procedural bars to the use of accusation 
evidence. While the prohibition against double jeopardy prevents the 
government from prosecuting a person for a crime for which he was 
previously acquitted, it does not prevent reconsideration of prior charges 
that did not result in a conviction for other purposes, particularly if the 
defendant is charged with new crimes. Appellate courts have widely 
condoned the reconsideration of unproven accusations in a criminal 
defendant’s past, generally by reasoning that the prosecution’s failure to 
convict a defendant of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
preclude a conclusion that the defendant is factually guilty of that crime. 
Thus, parole officers may revoke a person’s parole and send him back to 
prison based on crimes for which he was acquitted, prison officials may 
classify inmates as sexual offenders based on charges that the 
government dismissed, and judges may impose a more severe sentence 
on a defendant based on charges for which the jury found him not guilty. 
If an accused person admits his guilt or the government proves him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it is easy to understand why decision 
                                                     
2011/persons-arrested (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). For this reason, I will generally use male 
pronouns when referring to persons accused and convicted of crimes, although the circumstances 
described in this Article apply to women as well as men. 
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makers in the system might have greater confidence in the accuracy of 
that outcome than in the notion that the State’s failure to prove a case 
means that the defendant was factually innocent of the crime for which 
he was charged. There are certainly differences between an appellate 
review of a criminal conviction and the multiple ways that judges, 
prosecutors, and other state actors reconsider prior accusations for which 
no conviction was obtained. This Article will not argue otherwise. 
Instead, it will juxtapose the criminal justice system’s reliance on 
accusation evidence with its intense focus on obtaining and preserving 
convictions. It will note that doubt about the accuracy of the outcome of 
a criminal case plays a much larger and more dispositive role when 
decision makers review cases for which a conviction was not obtained 
than it does in the appellate review of criminal convictions. It will then 
conclude that this concern shifts in relation to an overarching systemic 
goal: Not the search for truth, but rather obtaining and preserving 
findings of guilt. 
Part I of this Article reviews the ways in which the criminal justice 
system seeks to obtain and maintain convictions. This Part will address 
the enormous pressures placed on defendants to plead guilty, the very 
small numbers of cases that actually make it to trial, an appellate process 
structured to discourage investigating claims of innocence and disturbing 
the verdict of guilt, and the adoption of the principle of finality, which 
holds that once a person has been convicted of a crime there should 
come a time when the appeals process is exhausted and the conviction 
can no longer be challenged in court. This Part will argue that the system 
tolerates uncertainty about the defendant’s culpability—up to and 
including claims of innocence in death penalty cases—when courts 
uphold convictions on appeal and when judges apply the principles of 
finality in the context of habeas corpus review. 
Part II will identify the ways in which the criminal justice system uses 
accusation evidence, noting how uncertainty about the defendant’s 
culpability in the absence of a conviction drives decision makers to 
reconsider that outcome and replace it with their own determinations of 
guilt. 
Part III will examine the system’s discordant treatment of the 
reconsideration of convictions and the reconsideration of charges for 
which no conviction was obtained, using the doctrine of finality as a 
comparison point. The finality doctrine imposes limits on the 
reconsideration of criminal convictions on habeas review, even when 
questions regarding the defendant’s innocence or the constitutionality of 
his arrest and prosecution remain. This Part argues that the justifications 
underlying the call for finality of convictions also support the limitation 
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or elimination of accusation evidence, while noting that courts do not 
invoke these principles to limit the reconsideration of criminal charges 
for which the government did not obtain a finding of guilt. 
Part IV argues that the different approaches to the reconsideration of 
prior outcomes in the criminal justice system are best understood as part 
of a larger systemic dedication to the preservation of guilt. This Part will 
then examine the implications of this dedication and suggest ways in 
which it might be dismantled. The Article then concludes. 
I. THE AMBIGUITY OF CONVICTIONS 
The search for truth is one of the paramount values of the criminal 
justice system in the United States.
2
 The presumption of innocence and 
the requirement that criminal charges be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt at trial bolster a view of the American justice system as one that 
seeks only to convict those defendants who are factually guilty. 
Prosecutors, agents of the government’s search for truth, are ethically 
bound to seek justice rather than a conviction;
3
 the system is thus 
understood as one in which the undisputedly guilty are convicted
4
 and 
the innocent are absolved.
5
 Yet consistently high conviction rates in our 
federal and state systems demonstrate that, once a person is charged with 
a crime, the resulting guilty plea or verdict is almost a foregone 
conclusion.
6
 
In 2013, ninety-two percent of federal criminal cases resulted in 
                                                     
2. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (“[W]e have placed our confidence in 
the adversary system, entrusting to it the primary responsibility for developing relevant facts on 
which a determination of guilt or innocence can be made.”). 
3. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the government’s duty 
“in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”). 
4. Even if this were true—and this Article will address the legitimacy of this viewpoint—it is 
worth noting that a system that successfully identifies and punishes the factually guilty is not 
necessarily a just one. One must also consider what actions that system defines as “criminal” and 
what punishments it considers to be proportionate to those purported crimes. See, e.g., MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2011) 
(discussing the War on Drugs and its consequences as a means of social control over black men). 
This Article notes, but does not engage in, this important discussion.  
5. See, e.g., Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (describing the “twofold aim” of the law as “that guilt shall 
not escape or innocence suffer”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND *358 (1765) (containing his famous and influential formulation: “It is better that ten 
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer”). 
6. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84 (2005) (“Acquittals are steadily disappearing from the federal system. Indeed, 
acquittals are disappearing more quickly than any other outcome, including trial convictions and 
dismissals, as guilty pleas expand to displace all other outcomes in federal court.”).  
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conviction.
7
 Of those convictions, ninety-seven percent were the result 
of a guilty plea and the remaining three percent were the result of trial 
verdicts,
8
 with similar statistics at the state level.
9
 Fewer and fewer cases 
go to trial; since 2010, approximately three percent of federal criminal 
cases were resolved by a trial, down from nineteen percent in 1980.
10
 
Some argue that the high rate of conviction accurately reflects the 
high rate of culpability of the criminally accused;
11
 others contend that it 
masks significant numbers of wrongful convictions.
12
 Regardless of 
which position is more accurate, there is no question that in some 
instances defendants who are not guilty are convicted.
13
 We might 
imagine that the appellate process is designed to investigate the 
                                                     
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ 
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 9 (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf (reporting that of the 
82,092 defendants with cases that closed during fiscal year 2013, 75,718 were convicted either 
through a plea or at trial, constituting a ninety-two percent conviction rate). Of course, not every 
arrest leads to a conviction; prosecutors decline to pursue charges in criminal cases for a variety of 
reasons, and those cases do not enter the criminal justice system. Id. at 7 (noting that, of the 172,024 
criminal cases that U.S. Attorneys’ offices received in fiscal year 2013, prosecutors declined 
25,629, for reasons including “weak or insufficient evidence” and “lack of criminal intent”). 
8. Id. at 9. 
9. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[The] criminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and 
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); Jacqueline E. Ross, The 
Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 
717 (2006) (“In the criminal justice systems of the 50 states, over 95 percent of all criminal cases 
are disposed of without a trial, through the entry of a guilty plea.”). 
10. See Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 
2014) http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ 
(noting the “virtual extinction of jury trials in federal criminal cases”). 
11. See, e.g., Morris Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 663, 674 
(2007) (arguing that wrongful conviction is a rare event and the public perception that it happens 
frequently is due to a “myth of innocence . . . driven more by legal academics, wrongful conviction 
advocates, and journalists than by the available data”); see also Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and 
the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23 (estimating the wrongful conviction rate as 
0.027%). 
12. See How Many Innocent People Are There in Prison?, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/How_many_innocent_people_are_there_in_prison.php 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Innocent People in Prison] (citing studies that estimate that 
between 2.3 percent and 5 percent of all prisoners in the U.S. are innocent); NAT’L REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Nov. 
3, 2015) (listing 1700 cases since 1989 in which people convicted of crimes were subsequently 
“cleared of all the charges based on new evidence of innocence”). 
13. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, REPORT: EXONERATIONS IN 2014, at 1 (2015) 
(reporting that 2014, with 125 exonerations, was “a record-breaking year for exonerations in the 
United States, by a large margin,” and citing the work of Conviction Integrity Units in prosecutors’ 
offices as a substantial reason for the upward trend in exonerations). 
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possibility of this error and reverse cases where meaningful doubt about 
the defendant’s guilt remains.14 But, in fact, the appellate process is not 
well designed to identify cases in which innocent people have been 
wrongfully convicted; it is procedurally difficult to make such claims, 
and even more difficult to win them.
15
 
A study by Professor Brandon L. Garrett brings the structural barriers 
to raising claims of factual innocence on appeal into stark relief. 
Professor Garrett investigated the appellate review of 200 cases of 
convicted persons who were later exonerated through the use of DNA 
evidence.
16
 This study demonstrated that, in the subgroup of 133 
convicted but factually innocent persons for whom courts issued written 
appellate or post-conviction opinions, appellate courts reversed the 
innocent person’s conviction only fourteen percent of the time—nine 
percent when the study group was narrowed to defendants convicted 
only of noncapital crimes.
17
 
False evidence (such as mistaken identifications—which played a role 
in seventy-nine percent of the wrongful convictions
18—false 
confessions, or perjured testimony given by informant witnesses) played 
a significant role in these wrongful convictions.
19
 In many cases, 
however, the innocent appellant did not raise constitutional challenges to 
                                                     
14. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1275 (2013) 
(stating that “the value of accuracy is at the heart of appellate review, and underlies both the error-
correction function of review and the public-trust function”). 
15. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
591, 592, 601 (arguing that, if appellate courts have a duty to identify and prevent wrongful 
convictions, that goal is “largely a failure”—a situation he describes as “truly alarming”). 
16. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 58–59 (2008) (describing 
the study as examining “how our criminal system handled, from start to finish, the cases of the first 
200 persons exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing in the United States,” by considering “the 
reasons why these people were wrongfully convicted, the claims they asserted and rulings they 
received during their appeals and post-conviction proceedings, how DNA testing eventually proved 
their innocence, and how they were exonerated”). 
17. These reversal rates were identical to a “matched comparison group” that consisted of persons 
convicted of the same charges, in the same state, and at the same time, as each of the exonerated 
people, but for whom no post-conviction DNA testing occurred. Id. at 61 (finding that appellate 
courts reversed nine percent of the noncapital convictions of the exonerees and ten percent of the 
matched comparison group of persons convicted of noncapital rape or murder, a “statistically 
insignificant” difference); see also Findley, supra note 15, at 594. (discussing the results of 
Professor Garrett’s study and noting that “of the 133 cases in which known innocents appealed their 
convictions, reviewing courts failed to recognize innocence or grant any relief in 86% of the cases, 
or 91% if only non-capital cases are counted”).  
18. Garrett, supra note 16, at 60. 
19. Id. at 60, 76 (stating that fifty-seven percent of the innocent persons were convicted “based on 
forensic evidence, chiefly serological analysis and microscopic hair comparison,” eighteen percent 
based on “informant testimony” and sixteen percent based on the defendant’s own false confession). 
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these factual errors on appeal.
20
 This was so, in large part, because courts 
had already severely restricted the availability of legal claims related to 
such factual issues,
21
 and stand-alone claims of actual innocence were 
likewise largely unavailable.
22
 Even when the appellants did raise legal 
claims regarding factual error or actual innocence, in most cases those 
efforts were unsuccessful.
23
 For example, while more than half of the 
wrongfully convicted persons who had falsely confessed to the crime 
challenged that confession on appeal, none had their convictions 
reversed on that basis.
24
 
Our system, Garrett concluded, is one “structurally averse to the 
correction of factual errors.”25 Our criminal appellate process generally 
fails to provide a means by which convicted persons might raise claims 
of factual error and actual innocence, and appellate courts do not treat 
the possibility of factual error as the primary justification to reconsider 
and reverse the outcome of a criminal case. A closer look at the process 
by which convictions are obtained and reviewed helps clarify this point. 
A.  Barriers to Raising Claims of Factual Innocence in Appellate 
Review of Guilty Pleas 
Whether or not the high rate of convictions generally reflects the 
aggregate guilt of criminal defendants, there are reasons to question a 
blanket confidence in the notion that a criminal conviction is always an 
accurate reflection of the defendant’s guilt. There is significant support 
for the argument that plea bargaining in particular, by which the 
government obtains the overwhelming percentage of all convictions, is 
structured primarily as an efficient method to resolve criminal cases 
rather than one designed to identify and punish the factually guilty.
26
 
                                                     
20. Id. at 76–77. 
21. Id. at 76–77, 94 (“[W]ith the exception of defendants in cases relying on confessions, fewer 
than half of the defendants brought constitutional claims challenging the types of evidence 
supporting their wrongful convictions. In part this is because few such constitutional claims exist.”). 
22. Id. at 112, 113 (explaining that “no petitioner has ever received relief under a constitutional 
theory that they were actually innocent,” and noting that other “legal avenues for claiming 
innocence remain extremely narrow”). 
23. Id. at 61, 108 (“Exonerees rarely received new trials based on factual claims challenging the 
evidence supporting their wrongful convictions,” and later noting that that when courts ruled on the 
merits of their appellate claims, they often concluded that any error was harmless, such that “[o]f 
exonerees with written decisions, 32% had a court rely on harmless error, and 16% had a court 
agree that a claim had merit, but nevertheless deny relief due to harmless error.”). 
24. Id. at 61. 
25. Id. at 131. 
26. See Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea 
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This is not to say that guilty pleas are always—or even often—
disconnected from factual guilt. But, while the majority of guilty pleas 
may accurately reflect the defendant’s culpability, some estimates 
indicate that innocent people plead guilty in between two to eight 
percent of felony cases.
27
 
Reliance on a guilty plea as trustworthy evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt is muddied by a closer look at the structure of the plea bargaining 
system, particularly the range of penalties that defendants face when 
they do not accept a plea. These consequences include the threat of 
added charges and longer sentences if the defendant does not plead 
guilty,
28
 often including additional sentencing penalties for requiring the 
prosecutor to prepare for trial.
29
 The defendant thus faces strong, even 
terrifying, inducements to take a plea, whether or not the charges are an 
accurate reflection of his conduct.
30
 And while courts require a “factual 
                                                     
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 246–47 (2007) (describing the criminal justice system as an 
“integrated plea bargaining machine that functionally works to overcome the cognitive resistance of 
criminal defendants to plead guilty”); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and 
Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 96–97 
(1977) (citing a variety of reasons that an innocent defendant might plead guilty, including “the 
disparity in punishment between conviction by plea and conviction by trial,” “the conditions of 
pretrial incarceration,” and “a desire to expedite the proceedings because of feelings of 
hopelessness, powerlessness, or despair when faced with the power of the state”). 
27. Rakoff, supra note 10 (citing criminologists’ estimates of the percentage of innocent people 
who plead guilty, and noting that, even if it is “no more than 1 percent” of felons, that would 
amount to 20,000 of the two million prisoners who are incarcerated as the result of guilty pleas); see 
When the Innocent Plead Guilty, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (describing thirty-one 
cases in which people pled guilty to crimes for which they were later exonerated through DNA 
testing).  
28. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW US FEDERAL 
PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 4–6 (2013), available at 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf. This document 
describes the variety of methods used by prosecutors to induce defendants to plead guilty, including 
filing charges carrying long sentences and then offering to reduce the severity of the consequences 
in a range of ways if the defendant takes a deal, or threatening to increase the severity of the 
punishment if the defendant does not plead guilty. For example, prosecutors often formally notify 
the court of the defendant’s prior convictions, which can in some circumstances double the sentence 
for a drug offense or increase the sentence to life in prison.  
29. These are not empty threats; according to the Human Rights Watch report on federal plea 
bargaining practices, “[i]n 2012, the average sentence for federal drug offenders convicted after trial 
was three times higher (16 years) than that received after a guilty plea (5 years and 4 months).” Id. 
at 2. 
30. See, e.g., The Best Defense Is a Good Defense, SERIAL (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://serialpodcast.org/season-one/10/the-best-defense-is-a-good-defense. In this popular podcast, 
focused on the conviction of Adnan Syed for the murder of his high school girlfriend, Mr. Syed 
states, in part, that “[o]nce you come into this whole system, one thing that you really learn is that 
no one really beats cases” and advises others accused of crimes to “take the deal. Regardless of 
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basis” for a plea,31 that requirement does not prevent defendants from 
pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit; defendants in some 
jurisdictions may, for example, enter a nolo contendere
32
 or Alford plea
33
 
instead. The fact that a person pleads guilty to a crime may or may not 
mean that he is guilty of committing it; a guilty plea does not therefore 
preclude uncertainty about the defendant’s factual culpability.34 
Once a defendant pleads guilty, however, the system is designed to 
preserve that plea. Defendants face obstacles to withdrawing their guilty 
pleas, particularly after sentencing has occurred or judgment has been 
imposed; in those circumstances, a defendant generally must establish 
that a withdrawal is required to cure a “manifest injustice,”35 a standard 
which primarily focuses on procedural defects such as whether the plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily made.
36
 Plea bargains offered by the 
government frequently require defendants to waive their constitutional 
and statutory rights, including the right to appeal, thus limiting the 
                                                     
whether you did it, take the deal.” 
31. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court 
must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”). 
32. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 675 (2015) (describing a nolo contendere, or “no contest” 
plea as one in which the defendant admits the elements of the charge against him while not 
“admit[ting] the allegations of the charge”). 
33. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding that “[a]n individual accused of 
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison 
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime”). 
34. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1034 (2007) (writing that “plea bargaining pressures even innocent defendants to plead guilty 
to avoid the risk of high statutory sentences . . . . This often results in individuals who accept a plea 
bargain receiving shorter sentences than other individuals who are less morally culpable but take a 
chance and go to trial”); see also Sydney Schneider, When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: 
Analyzing the Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence 
Movement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 279 (2013) (analyzing whether and in what 
circumstances defense attorneys should encourage their clients to enter into Alford pleas in cases of 
actual innocence).  
35. Broadly speaking, the difficulty of withdrawing a plea depends on when the petition is made; 
“[g]enerally, the earlier the withdrawal is undertaken, the easier it will be.” Robert L. Segar, Plea 
Bargaining Techniques, in 25 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 54 (2015). Some states only permit defendants 
to withdraw pleas before sentencing, others only before judgment is entered, and still others, like the 
federal courts, permit withdrawal after sentencing and judgment in order “to avoid manifest 
injustice” or a similar standard. Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure: Withdrawal of Plea, 
in 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.5(a) (3d ed. 2014). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Farley, 72 F.3d 158, 162–63 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that 
defendants seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing must show that “the withdrawal of his 
plea is necessary to correct a ‘manifest injustice,’” and the defendant’s claim of innocence did not 
meet this standard). 
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opportunity for review of the plea bargain beyond the trial level.
37
 The 
criminal justice system is thus structured to obtain guilty pleas through 
pressures that induce such pleas whether or not the defendant is actually 
guilty, and is further structured to preserve such pleas even when there is 
lingering uncertainty—or even substantial doubt—about their 
accuracy.
38
 
B.  Barriers to Raising Claims of Factual Innocence in Appellate 
Review of Jury Verdicts 
For the small percentage of criminal defendants who are convicted at 
trial, it seems harder to argue that those convictions are clouded with 
uncertainty about the defendant’s factual culpability. After all, the jury 
or judge has found the defendant, cloaked with the presumption of 
innocence, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
39
 He has been afforded the 
right to counsel,
40
 who must provide him with effective representation,
41
 
and has been given other protections including the right to compulsory 
process,
42
 a jury trial,
43
 and confrontation of the government’s 
witnesses.
44
 But even if the majority of criminal convictions obtained at 
trial are reflections of the defendant’s factual guilt, the growing numbers 
of people identified as wrongly convicted demonstrate that error does 
occur.
45
  
Regardless of whether criminal convictions are generally accurate 
reflections of the culpability of defendants as a whole, it is evident that 
                                                     
37. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing 
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (finding that, in a study of federal plea agreements, two-thirds 
required defendants to agree to waive all or some of their appellate rights, including, in many cases, 
the right to raise claims on collateral review, including allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel). 
38. Wright, supra note 6, at 154 (reviewing the history and scope of plea bargaining, and arguing 
that plea bargaining has “displace[d] acquittals and distort[ed] the truth-finding function of trials”).  
39. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
40. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
41. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
42. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
43. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
44. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
45. See, e.g., Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Rate of Wrongful Convictions, 48 
CRIM. LAW BULL. 221, 230 (2012) (suggesting “a general felony wrongful conviction rate of 
between 1/2 of 1% and 1%”); Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful 
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 832 (2010) (citing 
studies regarding the rate of wrongful convictions that “cap estimates at around 3% to 5% of 
convictions”). 
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once convictions are obtained the criminal appellate process is structured 
to preserve that outcome even when doubts as to the factual guilt of the 
defendant remain.
46
 While there is no constitutional right to appeal a 
criminal conviction,
47
 the federal government and most state 
governments
48
 provide people convicted of crimes the opportunity to do 
so.
49
 On the state level, convicted people can pursue their claims through 
a process of direct appeal, state post-conviction procedures, and federal 
habeas review; people convicted of federal crimes can pursue direct 
review in federal courts of appeal, followed by habeas review.
50
 In all 
these contexts, the convicted person faces significant procedural hurdles 
to raising innocence claims and a very small chance of success when 
such claims are raised.
51
 
A person who is charged with a crime, subjected to the processes of 
the criminal justice system, and convicted, is presumed by appellate 
courts to be guilty; the presumption of innocence is entirely gone.
52
 
                                                     
46. See Giovanna Shay, What We Can Learn About Appeals from Mr. Tillman’s Case: More 
Lessons from Another DNA Exoneration, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1536 (2009) (“It is a 
commonplace observation that appeals are not really about guilt and innocence.”). 
47. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (“[I]t is well settled that there is no 
constitutional right to an appeal.”); Robertson, supra note 14 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should, for due process and policy reasons, recognize a constitutional right to appeal in both 
criminal and civil cases). 
48. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 1222 n.8 (noting that “appellate remedies are nearly 
universal: the federal court system and forty-seven states provide—as a matter of state law—either a 
constitutional or statutory requirement for appeals as of right in both civil and criminal cases”—the 
state-level exceptions being New Hampshire, West Virginia, and Virginia). 
49. Even when the right to appeal exists, that right, in some circumstances, is not vigorously 
exercised. Juveniles convicted of crimes and people convicted of misdemeanor offenses generally 
have a right to appeal those outcomes, but the rate of appeal for juvenile and misdemeanor 
convictions is extremely low. See, e.g., Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 671, 672 (2012); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in 
the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 320 (2011). 
50. See Christopher M. Johnson, Post-Trial Judicial Review of Criminal Convictions: A 
Comparative Study of the United States and Finland, 66 ME. L. REV. 425, 428 (2012) (describing 
three levels of review for state prisoners: (1) direct appeal, (2) state post-conviction proceedings, 
and (3) federal habeas; and two levels for federal prisoners: (1) direct appeal and (2) habeas corpus). 
51. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 16, at 61 (reporting that appellate courts reversed nine percent of 
the convictions of a group of appellants who were later determined to be actually innocent); see also 
Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 825, 
829, 833 (2009) (assessing data on federal criminal appeals collected by the United States 
Sentencing Commission in 2006, and noting that “most criminal appeals, regardless of type, are 
affirmed,” although suggesting that perhaps the high rate of affirmance is due to a large number of 
“meritless” or “frivolous” appeals; further noting that “the overall average nationwide affirmance 
rate for 2006 criminal appeals was 68.5%,” though that rate varied from 49.3% to 85.1% depending 
on the circuit undertaking the appeal). 
52. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (“The purpose of the trial stage from the 
State’s point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one 
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Appellate review exists to determine whether legal error occurred,
53
 not 
to revisit factual determinations made at the trial level. Appellate courts 
are thus deferential to the facts established at trial, and will not consider 
new facts on direct appeal, even if those facts point to the defendant’s 
innocence.
54
 Although the appellant may argue that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction,
55
 it is usually impossible to raise 
factual innocence as a stand-alone legal claim.
56
 
Since innocence claims are frequently based on issues related to 
factual determinations at the trial level, such as mistaken eyewitness 
identification, dubious forensic evidence, and untrustworthy 
informants,
57
 it can be procedurally difficult to raise such claims on 
appeal. The convicted person must either attempt to couch his innocence 
claim in a limited number of direct constitutional arguments,
58
 or 
through arguments that challenge the introduction of the evidence rather 
than the evidence itself, such as claims that the evidence improperly 
came before the fact-finder due to prosecutorial misconduct.
59
 As 
                                                     
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
53. See Shay, supra note 46, at 1536 (noting the “conventional wisdom” that appellate courts are 
charged with evaluating the trial court’s compliance with legal principles rather than with revisiting 
factual decisions made by judges and juries).  
54. See Findley, supra note 15, at 602, 605 (arguing that appellate courts fail to protect against 
wrongful conviction for a variety of reasons, including their “extreme deference to trial-level fact 
finders on factual determinations and related questions like credibility,” and the fact that “there is no 
mechanism that ensures litigants a right to introduce new evidence of innocence during the direct 
appeal process”).  
55. Id. at 602 (noting that Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), requires courts reviewing 
sufficiency of the evidence claims to determine whether “if, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, there is insufficient evidence upon which a rational jury could find 
guilt,” but noting that most appellate courts have “applied this standard so deferentially that in 
practice they uphold convictions unless there is essentially no evidence supporting an element of the 
crime”). 
56. See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a 
Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New 
York in the Aftermath of CPL 440.10(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1472 (2013) (“Currently, very 
few states recognize freestanding state constitutional claims of actual innocence.”). 
57. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (identifying the most 
common causes of wrongful convictions as eyewitness misidentification, false confessions, 
government wrongdoing, untrustworthy informants, defense counsel error, and unsound forensic 
evidence). 
58. See Garrett, supra note 16, at 76, 77 n.80 (noting that, in a review of the appellate record of 
133 wrongfully convicted people, “fewer than half of the defendants brought constitutional claims 
challenging the types of evidence supporting their wrongful convictions,” among other reasons, 
because “few . . . constitutional claims exist” to challenge the type of evidence responsible for 
wrongful convictions). 
59. Id. at 77 (reporting that some of the exonerees in the study group raised evidentiary 
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Professor Garrett’s study of the appellate records of exonerated persons 
revealed, convicted people—even those who know they are innocent—
may abandon fact-based arguments on their direct appeals altogether 
because there are no legal avenues by which their innocence claims may 
be raised.
60
 If such arguments are made, appellate courts may side-step 
review because the defense lawyer at trial did not adequately “preserve” 
the issue, either by creating a record to support it or objecting in a timely 
manner.
61
 Even if courts do engage in a substantive analysis of the claim 
and further find that error occurred, the appellant may nevertheless lose 
because the court determines that the error, in one commentator’s words, 
“didn’t matter anyway”62—that the mistake was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
63
 Courts undertaking direct appellate review of 
convictions are therefore not engaged in resolving uncertainty about the 
defendant’s culpability; instead, the appellate process is designed both to 
preclude convicted persons from raising claims based on factual 
innocence and to prevent courts from granting relief for such claims 
when they are raised. 
Convicted persons have greater latitude to introduce new facts in 
post-conviction motions or state and federal habeas corpus appeals, but 
all of these layers of review have been criticized for the barriers they 
have erected to limit or prevent the meaningful consideration of 
innocence claims. The appellant is impeded by the lack of resources 
available to assist him in preparing these collateral appeals—for 
                                                     
challenges through claims that were “less direct” than a constitutional argument directed at the 
evidence itself; “[f]or example, rather than bring a claim that a confession was involuntary, one 
might indirectly assert a claim that the attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
confession”).  
60. Findley, supra note 15, at 595–97 (discussing the lack of legal arguments available for many 
claims of factual error, and noting that exonerated persons in the Garrett study who were convicted 
based on mistaken eyewitness identification “did not even raise challenges to the eyewitness 
identification evidence, even though these innocent defendants obviously knew it was 
mistaken . . . . Most defendants simply could not even find a viable claim to make to challenge the 
actually mistaken, false identification evidence in their cases”). 
61. Shay, supra note 46, at 1539 (discussing the frequency with which state appellate courts 
“dispose of claims for lack of preservation or failure to make an adequate record,” including 
counsel’s “failure to object or make a legal argument, failure to ensure sufficient memorialization of 
what transpired at trial, and failure to make an adequate ‘offer of proof’ or request an evidentiary 
hearing”). 
62. Id. at 1542. 
63. Findley, supra note 15, at 603–04 (explaining that the doctrine of harmless error 
“encourage[s] courts to overlook error, even when they find that it exists,” and further noting that 
“other legal standards, such as the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and for establishing 
a Brady violation, encourage courts to ignore possible impediments to accuracy by imposing on the 
defendant a burden of proving prejudice from the errors of defense counsel or the prosecutor”). 
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example, appellants seeking post-conviction relief do not have a right to 
counsel except in capital cases.
64
 In state post-conviction motions, such 
as a motion for a new trial, defendants are hampered in raising wrongful 
convictions claims by short statutes of limitations,
65
 as well as the fact 
that the motion is considered by the original trial judge, who may be 
inclined, for a variety of reasons, to preserve the original verdict 
obtained on his or her watch.
66
 In state habeas corpus review, complex 
procedures, high burdens of proof, and demonstrably poor records in 
remedying trial-level constitutional error combine to create a process 
inhospitable to identifying and rectifying wrongful convictions.
67
 
A petitioner seeking relief for a wrongful conviction through federal 
habeas review is also highly unlikely to meet with success.
68
 The 
Supreme Court has held that the “Great Writ” does not exist to remedy 
free-standing claims of actual innocence, as “federal habeas courts sit to 
ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the 
                                                     
64. Id. at 615 (discussing the limitations on raising claims based on new evidence in post-
conviction or habeas motions, including the fact that the convicted person has no right to a court-
appointed lawyer or experts, nor to transcripts; that the passage of time hinders the appellant’s 
ability to find the evidence in the first place; and that “the burden for obtaining relief in such 
collateral proceedings is often higher than on direct appeal”); see also Lee Kovarsky, Original 
Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 88–89 (2011) (discussing the statutes governing the appointment 
of counsel in federal habeas proceedings, and noting that, while ninety-five percent of capital 
prisoners were represented by counsel in their habeas appeals, “only about two percent of criminally 
confined, noncapital prisoners had lawyers”). 
65. See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly 
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 676 (2005).  
66. See Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Federal Habeas Corpus 
and the Piecemeal Problem in Actual Innocence Cases, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 55, 62 (2014) 
(discussing the concern that judges considering motions for a new trial may display a “cognitive 
bias [that] operates to subconsciously prejudice judges toward upholding their prior decisions,” a 
bias that might be exacerbated by the need for elected judges to appear “tough on crime” and the 
desire to defer to the jury’s determination of guilt; noting also that “in some states, there is no right 
to appeal a motion for new trial, but even where there is, the standard of review requiring abuse of 
discretion is often regarded as so high that it effectively precludes relief to a defendant claiming 
actual innocence”). 
67. See id. at 63–64 (describing the barriers to claims of actual innocence in state-level post-
conviction proceedings, and concluding that “[w]hile the innocent prisoner is presented with a 
façade of protection in the form of direct appeal and collateral attack of the conviction via motion 
for a new trial and state habeas review, nothing lies beneath the surface”). 
68. See id. at 64 (noting that federal habeas petitions are “virtually never granted”); NANCY J. 
KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE GREAT WRIT 79, 87–100 (2011) (stating that approximately 0.35% of habeas petitions brought 
by state prisoners in noncapital cases result in a remand to state court); Ronald Quy Tran, State 
Trial Courts as the New Champions of the Great Writ: An Argument for a Statement of Decision in 
the Criminal Context, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 163, 169 (2012) (“Statistically speaking, there is virtually 
no likelihood of obtaining relief from unconstitutional trial error on federal collateral review.”). 
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Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.”69 The federal Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
70
 enacted in 1996, is 
particularly responsible for a host of procedural and substantive 
limitations on habeas review.
71
 The AEDPA, among other changes, 
established a one-year statute of limitations for filing habeas petitions,
72
 
required that federal courts display greater deference to state court 
rulings,
73
 barred successive claims except in limited circumstances,
74
 and 
required prisoners arguing innocence to prove such innocence by clear 
and convincing evidence.
75
 Many have argued that these and other 
changes have acted to severely restrict habeas corpus relief “even when 
newly discovered evidence suggests the prisoner might be innocent.”76 
Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in In re Davis,
77
 “This 
Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a 
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to 
convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”78 
Many of the restrictions placed on habeas corpus petitions arose, at 
least in part, from allegiance to the core, though much criticized, 
principle of finality.
79
 Proponents of finality argue that, once a 
conviction has been obtained, there is value in requiring the system to 
                                                     
69. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (noting, however, that “a truly persuasive 
demonstration of actual innocence” in a death case might, in theory, constitute a permissible 
freestanding claim to habeas relief); see also The Supreme Court 2012 Term: Leading Cases, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 318, 323 (2013) (describing habeas review as serving “to ensure procedural justice 
in criminal proceedings. It is not directly concerned with substantive justice”). 
70. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
71. But see Kimberly A. Thomas, Substantive Habeas, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1749, 1767 (2014) 
(acknowledging that “at least some scholars believed that the Court had already done the most 
significant procedural ‘reforms’ prior to the passage of AEDPA. Other scholars echoed the limited 
impact of AEDPA on the substantive side”). 
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012). 
73. Id. § 2254(d), (e). 
74. Id. § 2244(b). 
75. Id. § 2254(e)(1); see also Hartung, supra note 66, at 75–82 (describing the provisions of the 
AEDPA as “barriers to factually innocent prisoners seeking post-conviction relief” and arguing that 
the act “rendered federal habeas corpus procedure a façade that appears to facilitate review of actual 
innocence claims without actually doing so”).  
76. Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2313, 2361 (2007); see also Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas 
After Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2088 (2014) (describing the focus of habeas review 
as “denying relief to the guilty, not on providing relief to the innocent”). 
77. 577 U.S. 901 (2009). 
78. Id. at 955.  
79. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 168, 178 (2001) (describing the AEDPA as advancing the 
“principles of comity, finality, and federalism”). 
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reach a point where it stops reconsidering what it has done before. The 
judicial adherence to strict appellate deadlines is an example of the value 
of finality trumping questions of the accuracy of the criminal 
conviction.
80
 Finality has played its most significant role, however, in 
the context of habeas corpus review. Legions of courts have cited the 
principles underlying the call for finality in support of significant 
restrictions on habeas corpus relief, and the AEDPA in particular 
ushered in an era in which courts considering habeas petitions have 
valued the finality of a conviction above almost all else.
81
 
Our criminal justice system is thus one that pushes hard to obtain a 
conviction, and, once that conviction is obtained, is one designed to 
preserve it, even when ambiguity about the defendant’s guilt remains. 
Indeed, as we have seen, post-conviction review procedures are often 
structured to avoid questions regarding the accuracy of the conviction 
altogether. It is true that DNA exonerations in recent years have 
challenged the perception of the criminal justice system as nearly 
flawless; gone are the days when Learned Hand famously described the 
concept of a wrongful conviction as an “unreal dream.”82 Courts and 
legislatures have taken some action to address the injustice of wrongful 
convictions, such as through the enactment of laws allowing convicted 
persons to seek post-conviction DNA testing in some circumstances
83
 or 
through the creation of so-called “Innocence Commissions” with the 
power to investigate claims of actual innocence after a conviction has 
occurred.
84
 (Even these types of efforts have limitations, however, such 
                                                     
80. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 1275 (“In almost every case, however the value of accuracy 
will eventually give way to a need for finality, as evidenced by the universal existence of appellate 
deadlines.”). For another example of finality’s influence on the justice system, see Sarah French 
Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79 
(2012) (describing the refusal of federal courts to correct sentencing errors on collateral review—
even when the error is acknowledged by the prosecutor and sentencing court—based on allegiance 
to the principles of finality). 
81. Marceau, supra note 76, at 2086 (“First, federal habeas review, particularly after the 
enactment of the AEDPA, is considerably less hospitable to any federal judgments that would 
disturb the federalism concerns and finality of a state conviction.”). 
82. United States v. Garrison, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (“Our procedure has always been 
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream.”); see also Findley, supra 
note 15, at 593 (“Until recently, we have taken it on faith that the appellate system does what it 
purports to do—ensures largely error-free trials that accurately sort the guilty from the innocent,” 
but “[p]ostconviction DNA testing has changed that.”). 
83. Garrett, supra note 16, at 117–18 (describing the recent enactment of laws allowing post-
conviction DNA testing in many jurisdictions, but noting that such laws often impose “difficult 
preliminary showings” and require the asset of law enforcement). 
84. See David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2010) (arguing that Innocence Commissions can provide a more robust 
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as restricting review to cases involving DNA evidence,
85
 or excluding 
review of guilty pleas.)
86
 And, of course, there are cases where appellate 
courts overturn convictions because of factual error or proof of 
innocence. Despite these efforts, however, our system of appellate 
review is not well designed to address or resolve uncertainty regarding 
the accuracy of a criminal conviction. 
While the criminal justice system is willing to tolerate uncertainty 
about whether a conviction was reflective of factual guilt, this tolerance 
does not extend to uncertainty about the accuracy of cases that did not 
result in a conviction. As Part II reveals, if a person is charged with a 
crime and not convicted, the lingering concern that the defendant might 
nevertheless be guilty is precisely what drives the continual 
reconsideration of the prior charge, as prosecutors, judges, probation 
officers, and others are free to substitute the outcome of acquittal or 
dismissal with their own determination of culpability. 
II.  THE IMMORTALITY OF ACCUSATIONS 
Just as a person convicted of a crime might be innocent, a person 
acquitted of a crime may be guilty. The fact that the government chose 
to dismiss a criminal charge or a factfinder determined that the 
government failed to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt is a far cry 
from a conclusion that the accused person was factually innocent of the 
crime. Prosecutors routinely dismiss charges as part of plea bargains, not 
because of a belief that the initial accusation was false. Jurors or judges 
may enter acquittals not because they believe the defendant was truly 
innocent, but rather because of their legal obligation to find a defendant 
not guilty if any reasonable doubt as to his guilt remains. Since there is 
often no way to know why the jury was motivated to acquit or the 
prosecutor to dismiss, those outcomes leave room for uncertainty about 
the defendant’s true culpability of the crime for which he was not 
convicted.
87
 
                                                     
review of actual innocence claims than the appellate review and post-conviction review process).  
85. This, despite the fact that “DNA cases represent a very small percentage of criminal cases 
overall.” Hartung, supra note 66, at 71.  
86. See Wolitz, supra note 84, at 1040 (reviewing some legislative efforts to expand “innocence-
based post-conviction challenges,” but noting that “these statutes so restrict the type of claims that 
can be brought, the classes of prisoners who can bring such claims, and the timeframe within which 
such challenges can be brought, that they fail to provide the orderly mechanism for post-conviction 
relief that they promise”). 
87. There are therefore not readily available statistics about the percentage of guilty people who 
wrongfully avoid conviction, either through acquittals or because the prosecution dismissed the 
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Once a person is acquitted of a crime, the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment bars the government from prosecuting him for that 
offense a second time.
88
 Nevertheless, when the state fails to obtain a 
conviction against a criminally accused person, courts generally consider 
that outcome as a process failure, reflecting the challenges of a high 
standard of proof
89
 or the overly burdened system,
90
 rather than an 
accurate determination that the defendant did not commit the crime.
91
 
Decision makers ranging from judges imposing sentences to parole 
officers making parole revocation determinations thus may base their 
decisions, at least in part, on charges for which the defendant was not 
convicted. This reliance is animated by the suspicion that such charges 
represent acts for which the defendant is factually guilty, but for which 
                                                     
charges. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1325 n.25, 1396 (1997) (“[T]here is no legal 
literature dealing with acquittals generally . . . . There are no appellate decisions. No defense 
committees organize to demonstrate the injustice of false acquittals.”). In a 2006 paper, Estimating 
the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, Bruce D. Spencer sought to analyze the accuracy of jury verdicts by 
comparing the rate at which judges agree with the jury’s verdict, ultimately estimating that the 
conditional probability by which a jury incorrectly acquits is 0.14, as compared to a 0.25 probability 
of incorrect convictions. See Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating Accuracy of Jury Verdicts 
(Northwestern Univ. Inst. Policy Research, Working Paper No. WP-06-05, 2006), available at 
http://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/publications/doc/workingpapers/2006/IPR-WP-06-05.pdf. 
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). This is so, as the United States Supreme Court has explained:  
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of 
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
89. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) 
(“[A]cquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the 
existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.”); see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 
(1997) (“An acquittal can only be an acknowledgment that the government failed to prove an 
essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Without specific jury findings, no one 
can logically or realistically draw any factual finding inferences . . . .” (quoting United States v. 
Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996))); Claire M. Murray, Hard Cases Make Good Law: The 
Intellectual History of Prior Acquittal Sentencing, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1415, 1463–64 (2010) 
(noting that “at present there is no verdict whereby a criminal defendant may definitively prove his 
innocence and have that innocence be certified by the state”). 
90. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2471, 2479 (2004) (observing that both prosecutors and defense lawyers have incentives to plea 
bargain that are influenced by excessive caseloads). 
91. Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
1297, 1299 (2000) (“Given our deeply rooted preference for acquitting guilty people to convicting 
the innocent, we strongly suspect that many defendants who are acquitted were in fact guilty . . . .”). 
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he escaped justice.
92
 
These decision makers generally rely on accusation evidence as an 
indicator of the actor’s character and a predictor of his future conduct. 
Accusation evidence plays other roles as well; for example, a dismissed 
charge or acquittal may constitute evidence that the accused person 
violated terms of his parole or possessed specific skills relevant to the 
commission of a new crime. But the belief that prior criminal acts 
provide decision makers with salient information about a person’s 
character or his likelihood to commit future crimes informs the use of 
accusation evidence in most circumstances—from sex crime 
prosecutions to credibility determinations in trial. Judges, prosecutors, 
probation officers, parole officials, and others thus seek to understand 
what kind of person the defendant is and how he or she may behave in 
the future by looking at his or her prior criminal acts—whether the 
defendant was convicted of those acts or not.
93
 Whether or not these 
decision makers are correct in their assumption that a person’s prior acts 
have predictive power for his future conduct or provide insight into his 
                                                     
92. A distrust of acquittals and dismissals extends beyond the criminal justice system. For 
example, people who have been arrested but not convicted of crimes often experience challenges in 
finding housing and employment, just as if they had been found guilty of those offenses. See THE 
LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT ON STATE LEGAL 
BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 10, 16 (2004), available at 
http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/ (noting that “many public housing authorities deny 
eligibility for federally assisted housing based on an arrest that never led to a conviction” and citing 
the fact that “37 states have laws permitting all employers and occupational licensing agencies to 
ask about and consider arrests that never led to conviction in making employment decisions”). Some 
find themselves on public criminal registries based on allegations for which they have not sustained 
a criminal conviction. See John Sherman, Procedural Fairness for State Abuse Registries: The Case 
for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 867, 872 (2011) 
(describing state laws that require the inclusion of individuals on public child abuse and adult abuse 
registries based on a state agency’s finding that abuse occurred). Accusations thus retain a perpetual 
influence outside of the system, in the form of a wide variety of civil consequences, and within the 
system, in the form of accusation evidence. 
93. The use of accusation evidence may increase, as scholars and advocates from both defense 
and prosecution camps are increasingly calling for courts to engage in “evidence-based decision 
making,” which calls for courts to base judicial decisions on peer-reviewed social science research. 
See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LOCAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 6 (2010) (describing a goal of building “a systemwide framework 
(arrest through final disposition and discharge) that will result in more collaborative, evidence-based 
decisionmaking and practices in local criminal justice systems”). This movement asks judges, in 
sentencing, to look at aspects of the defendant’s life that are, according to proponents of this 
approach, more generally tied to future offending. See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: 
Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1355–
56 (2011). Under the evidence-based approach, “adult criminal history is the staple of risk 
prediction”—a staple that includes arrest records as well as convictions. Id. 
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character (a much-debated question
94
), the reliance on accusation 
evidence may be understood as an effort on the part of the criminal 
justice system to engage in the search for truth. 
This Part will review the ways in which decision makers rely on 
accusation evidence—again, evidence of alleged crimes for which the 
defendant was previously charged but not convicted—during trial, 
juvenile transfer hearings, and sentencing. It will also touch on the use of 
accusation evidence at decision points that are inherent to the charging 
and punishment phases of the criminal justice system: the filing of 
charges, parole revocation hearings, and prison classification procedures. 
At each stop along the way, this Part cites the facts of real cases to 
illustrate the profound effect that accusation evidence can have on the 
experience of both defendants and prisoners within the criminal justice 
system. 
A. Accusation Evidence in Trial 
In the U.S. justice system, a defendant can only be convicted of a 
crime at trial if the prosecutor proves each element of the offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt. During the trial, however, a variety of evidentiary 
rules allow judges to permit the introduction of other criminal acts for 
which the person was formerly prosecuted but not convicted, for 
purposes ranging from establishing a motive for the new offense to 
attacking the credibility of a witness. 
1. Accusation Evidence as “Other Act” Evidence Under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b)(2) 
Charles Smith, Jr., was charged with two counts of armed robbery and 
one count of bank robbery
95
 based on allegations that he robbed two 
convenience stores and a bank during a journey from Dalton to Atlanta, 
Georgia.
96
 Although he was acquitted of the convenience store robberies 
in his first trial, the jury was hung on the bank robbery charge. In his 
eventual retrial on the bank robbery charge, the court allowed the 
prosecutor to introduce testimony about the convenience store robberies 
                                                     
94. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the ‘Grotesque’ Doctrine of Character 
Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 
741 (2008); Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1998); Charles 
Rose, Should the Tail Wag the Dog?: The Potential Effects of Recidivism Data on Character 
Evidence Rules, 36 N.M. L. REV. 341 (2006). 
95. Along with related firearms charges. 
96. United States v. Smith, 148 F. App’x 867 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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for which Mr. Smith had been acquitted in order to identify him as the 
perpetrator of the bank robbery. The appellate court upheld the lower 
court’s ruling, noting that, while Mr. Smith had been acquitted of the 
convenience store robberies, the jury’s verdicts of acquittal did “not 
represent findings of true innocence.”97 
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), and similar rules in all fifty 
states, forbid the introduction at trial of evidence of a person’s crime, 
wrong, or other act “to prove a person’s character in order to show that 
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with that 
character.”98 FRE 404(b)(2) and its state-level counterparts do, however, 
permit parties to introduce so-called “other act” evidence, such as Mr. 
Smith’s acquitted convenience store robberies, to prove such things as 
motive, identity, intent, preparation, plan, or knowledge—indeed, for 
any purpose other than proof of a character trait.
99
 In practical terms, this 
means that lawyers may present the fact-finder with evidence that the 
defendant committed an act other than the one for which he is being 
prosecuted, so long as they avoid arguing that the other act is 
emblematic of his flawed character. Other act evidence is not limited 
solely to criminal acts,
100
 but such evidence is generally offered by a 
prosecutor against a criminal defendant, and is frequently of a criminal 
nature.
101
 
When lawyers introduce allegations that a person has committed other 
criminal acts under FRE 404(b)(2), they are not limited to acts for which 
that person has been convicted. In Huddleston v. United States,
102
 the 
Supreme Court held that a judge may admit other act evidence if he or 
                                                     
97. Id. at 870. 
98. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
99. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as 
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident.”). 
100. A prosecutor might, for example, attempt to introduce evidence that a defendant charged 
with murder had an affair with the decedent to demonstrate that the defendant had a motive to kill, 
such as keeping the affair a secret. The court is likely to admit this evidence under 404(b)(2) (or its 
state-level equivalent) so long as the prosecutor avoids arguing that the affair is evidence that the 
defendant is a morally flawed person who is therefore more likely to have committed a homicide—
the inference forbidden under 404(b)(1). 
101. See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 
404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 216 (2005) (arguing that “[u]ncharged misconduct evidence may be 
admissible under a comforting legal theory, i.e., to prove a non-character intermediate issue. 
However, its real value to the prosecution is the forbidden innuendo: uncharged misconduct proves 
that the defendant committed other crimes, thereby making it more likely that the defendant 
committed the crimes charged in the indictment because the defendant has an evil character”). 
102. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
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she determines that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the other act occurred.
103
 In Dowling v. United 
States,
104
 the Supreme Court established that the introduction at trial of 
other act evidence for which the defendant was previously acquitted 
does not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy or Due Process clauses of the 
Constitution.
105
 Federal circuit courts have further held that the fact that 
the prosecutor’s office dismissed a charge in the past does not prohibit 
lawyers from introducing evidence of that criminal act in a future trial 
under FRE 404(b)(2).
106
 
Under the low federal standard established by Huddleston
107
 and the 
standards of proof applied to this evidence by many state courts—all of 
which fall below proof beyond a reasonable doubt
108—lawyers are able 
to routinely introduce accusations for which the person has never been 
                                                     
103. Id. at 689–90. In Huddleston, the Court identified whether “the jury can reasonably conclude 
that the act occurred and the defendant was the actor” as a question of conditional relevance 
governed by FRE 104(b). Id. at 689. It held that “[i]n determining whether the Government has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility nor 
makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could 
reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 690. 
104. 493 U.S. 342 (1990). 
105. Id. at 351–53 (holding that the introduction of evidence that defendant committed another 
crime, despite the fact that he had been acquitted of that crime at trial, was not precluded by the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel because of the difference between the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard required in trial and the lower Huddleston standard applied to 404(b) evidence and thus did 
not violate the due process test). 
106. United States v. Carney, 387 F.3d 436, 450–52 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in the introduction of “evidence of similar transactions . . . which had been the subjects of 
dismissed counts or counts of acquittal at the defendants’ initial trial” because the government 
“need not prove probative ‘other acts’ beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, that proof must merely be 
sufficiently compelling such that ‘the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the 
defendant was the actor’”). 
107. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 181 (4th ed. 2013) (describing 
the Huddleston holding as “a very lax standard”). 
108. See, e.g., People v. McGraw, 30 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2001). Many state courts have held 
that when the prosecution introduces evidence that the defendant has committed other criminal acts 
for which he or she has been acquitted, the court should instruct the jury about the acquittal. See 
Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548, 555–56 (Colo. 2008) (noting that in cases analyzing the 
introduction by the prosecution of other act evidence for which the defendant had been acquitted, 
“[s]tate courts . . . have generally ruled that under the facts of a particular case, a defendant was 
entitled to an acquittal instruction,” but also noting that federal courts do not usually find that lower 
courts have abused their discretion in failing to provide an acquittal instruction under those 
circumstances); Christopher Bello, American Law Reports Admissibility of Evidence as to Other 
Offense as Affected by Defendant’s Acquittal of that Offense, 25 A.L.R. 4th 934 (2015) (compiling 
case law from federal and state courts regarding the admissibility of evidence of an act for which the 
defendant has been acquitted, and the defendant’s right, if the act is allowed into evidence, to 
introduce proof that he or she had been acquitted of that act in a prior trial). 
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convicted as other act evidence at trial. 
2. Accusation Evidence in Sex Assault and Child Molestation Trials 
Ralph Hess was charged with sexual assault, but claimed the sex was 
consensual.
109
 At trial, in order to rebut his claim of consent, the 
prosecution introduced testimony from another woman who claimed that 
Mr. Hess had sexually assaulted her in the past. The court permitted the 
introduction of this testimony despite the fact that Mr. Hess had been 
acquitted of that prior alleged assault. That acquittal, the appellate court 
later wrote, did not prove that Mr. Hess was innocent, but “only that the 
state did not prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”110 
It is not unusual for the government, as in Mr. Hess’s case, to seek to 
prove a sexual assault charge by introducing evidence of a prior sexual 
assault for which the defendant was never convicted. Accusation 
evidence plays a role in federal (and some state-level) sex assault or 
child molestation trials. In such prosecutions, FRE 413 and 414 allow 
prosecutors to admit evidence that the defendant “committed any other 
sex assault” or “any other child molestation” for any purpose for which 
such evidence is relevant, including the character evidence generally 
forbidden under FRE 404(b)(1).
111
 The government is not limited to 
introducing evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual assault or child 
molestation convictions, but may also introduce prior accusations of 
those crimes that did not result in a finding or plea of guilty. Federal 
district courts have held that this type of accusation evidence may be 
admitted under the Huddleston standard described above—that is, after 
the court makes a preliminary determination that a reasonable jury could 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed 
the prior crime.
112
 
                                                     
109. Hess v. Alaska, 20 P.3d 1121 (Alaska 2001). 
110. Id. at 1125 (holding that the defendant should have been permitted to inform the jury about 
the fact that he was acquitted of the prior crime, as it could “help the jury weigh the evidence of the 
prior act”). 
111. “In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a sexual assault, the court may admit 
evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault. The evidence may be considered on 
any matter to which it is relevant.” FED. R. EVID. 413(a). “In a criminal case in which a defendant is 
accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other 
child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.” FED. R. 
EVID. 414(a).  
112. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2008) (“To be admissible 
under Rule 413, the uncharged ‘offense of sexual assault’ need not be established by a conviction, 
but the district court must make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the other act and that it constituted an 
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Although the majority of states have not adopted evidence rules 
equivalent to FRE 413 and 414, a significant number of states have 
passed legislation that broadens the criteria for admissibility of other 
sexual crimes in sex assault and child molestation cases.
113
 In those 
states, as under the federal rules, courts may admit evidence of 
accusations of other sexual crimes for which the defendant was not 
convicted as well as convictions for such crimes. When a prosecutor 
seeks to admit accusation evidence in a sexual assault trial in one of 
these states, state appellate courts have held that the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant committed the prior sexual crime either by clear 
and convincing evidence
114
 or by a preponderance of the evidence.
115
 
3. Accusation Evidence and Credibility 
Accusation evidence also plays a role in challenges to a witness’s 
                                                     
‘offense of sexual assault’ for purposes of Rule 413.”); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 
1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that “similar acts must be established by ‘sufficient evidence to 
support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act’”). Not every court applies 
the Huddleston standard when deciding whether to admit prior accusations of sexual assault or child 
molestation under FREs 413 and 414. See, e.g., United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1120 
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[e]vidence that tends to show that Redlightning committed another 
sexual assault, namely, his 1990 confession to that sexual assault, was admissible under Rule 413 
because it tends to show that Redlightning had the propensity to commit another sexual assault”). 
Some appellate courts have established factors that the trial court must consider when applying FRE 
403 to FRE 413 and 414. See, e.g., United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(citing several factors that “district judges must evaluate in determining whether to admit evidence 
of a defendant’s prior acts of sexual misconduct,” including the similarity between the prior acts to 
the acts charged in the current trial, how close in time the prior acts were to the new alleged crime, 
and how often the prior acts occurred). 
113. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 4:16 (1998) (noting 
the passage of legislation “selectively abolishing the character evidence prohibition in sexual assault 
prosecutions, in a fifth of the states, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, and 
Texas”); see also Basyle J. Tchividjian, Predators and Propensity: The Proper Approach for 
Determining the Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 39 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 327, 342 (2012) (“Though no state has adopted them in their entirety, 
approximately eleven states have codified rules which are similar in substance and application to 
FRE 413 and FRE 414.”). 
114. See, e.g., McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1262 (Fla. 2006) (“Of course, before even 
considering whether to allow evidence of prior acts to be presented to the jury, the trial court must 
find that the prior acts were proved by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
115. See, e.g., CALJIC, Evidence of Other Crimes by the Defendant Proved by a Preponderance 
of the Evidence § 2.50.1 (7th ed. 2003). These jury instructions state, in part, that: 
Within the meaning of the preceding instruction[s], the prosecution has the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed [a] [crime[s]] [or] [sexual 
offense[s]] other than [that] [those] for which [he] [she] is on trial. You must not consider this 
evidence for any purpose unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [a] [the] 
defendant committed the other [crime[s]] [or] [sexual offense[s]]. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
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credibility at trial. FRE 608(b), and similar rules in the majority of the 
states, allows attorneys to cross-examine witnesses about specific 
instances of the witness’s conduct if those instances are deemed 
probative of the character of truthfulness
116
 or untruthfulness of the 
witness.
117
 These specific instances are not limited to criminal acts—
courts may find other types of conduct, such as fabricating information 
on a resume, to be probative of an untruthful character—but cross-
examination under 608(b) frequently involves questions about crimes 
such as fraud and perjury.
118
 While most states forbid attorneys from 
questioning a witness about crimes that did not result in a conviction, 
federal courts allow questioning about specific instances of conduct, 
including evidence of a criminal act for which the witness was charged 
but not convicted, so long as the questioner has “a good-faith factual 
basis for the questioning.”119 
B. Accusation Evidence in Juvenile Transfer Hearings 
Sixteen-year-old Terry Wilson was arrested for selling cocaine and 
crack.
120
 The government wished to charge him in adult rather than 
juvenile court, and the trial judge ordered the transfer after a hearing. In 
determining that Terry Wilson should be treated as an adult rather than a 
child in the criminal justice system, the court relied, among other 
information, on arrests for which he was not convicted. The appellate 
court affirmed, stating that it was within the court’s discretion to rely on 
the entirety of Wilson’s juvenile record, convictions and accusations 
alike.
121
 
Terry Wilson’s case represents a contested question in our nation’s 
juvenile court system: the role that prior, unproven accusations in the 
child’s record should play in determining whether or not he should be 
                                                     
116. FRE 608(a) mandates, however, that “evidence of truthful character is admissible only after 
the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.” FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
117. Or probative of the character of another witness about whose character “the witness being 
cross-examined has testified about.” FED. R. EVID. 608(b)(2).  
118. See, e.g., United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1389 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Rule 608 
authorizes inquiry only into instances of misconduct that are ‘clearly probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness,’ such as perjury, fraud, swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement.” (citations 
omitted)). 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Courtney, 439 F. App’x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing United 
States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 970–71 (5th Cir. 1985)) (“For testimony about such an alleged bad 
act to be admissible under Rule 608(b), the questioning party must have a good-faith factual basis 
for the questioning.”). 
120. United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998). 
121. Id. 
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tried as an adult. Since separate courts for children accused of crimes 
were first instituted in the 1890s, the federal government and all fifty 
states have established juvenile courts with a focus on the rehabilitation 
of the child who has committed a criminal act.
122
 These courts retain 
jurisdiction over children under eighteen charged with criminal offenses. 
In some circumstances, however, children charged with crimes may 
instead be tried and sentenced in adult court under a variety of 
procedures known generally as “transfer” or “waiver” proceedings. The 
decision to charge a juvenile as an adult carries significant repercussions 
for the child,
123
 and accusation evidence is frequently a factor in this 
determination.
124
 
1. Accusation Evidence and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile 
Transfer Decisions 
When prosecutorial discretion laws control transfer decisions, 
prosecutors have the authority to decide whether juveniles charged with 
certain crimes will be charged in adult or juvenile court. Transfer laws 
that fall into the “prosecutorial discretion” category give power solely to 
district attorneys to decide whether to file charges against a child in 
juvenile or adult court, but generally provide no criteria to guide that 
decision, nor provide for review of the decision once it is made.
125
 
                                                     
122. Brian Fuller, Criminal Law—A Small Step Forward in Juvenile Sentencing, But Is It 
Enough? The United States Supreme Court Ends Mandatory Juvenile Life Without Parole 
Sentences; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 13 WYO. L. REV. 377, 378–79 (2013) (“The 
dissatisfaction with a criminal court system that detained, tried, and punished children in the same 
manner as adults led to the creation of a separate juvenile court systems in the 1890s.”); Emily A. 
Polachek, Juvenile Transfer: From ‘Get Better’ to ‘Get Tough’ and Where We Go from Here, 35 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1162, 1166 (writing that the creation of the first juvenile courts in the 
United States dates back to “the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899” and further explaining that, by 
“1945, juvenile courts existed in every jurisdiction in the country, including the federal court 
system”). 
123. These repercussions include exposure to lengthier prison sentences and incarceration with 
adults rather than in facilities designed for juveniles, where they are at high risk of victimization by 
older inmates. See, e.g., Randie P. Ullman, Federal Juvenile Waiver Practices: A Contextual 
Approach to the Consideration of Prior Delinquency Records, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1329, 1346 
(2000) (“Statistics reveal that juveniles transferred to adult court and housed in adult prisons are five 
times more likely to become victims of sexual assault and at least 50% more likely to be attacked 
with a weapon than those juveniles housed in rehabilitation facilities.”).  
124. A third category of laws known as statutory exclusion laws specify particular types of 
crimes that must be charged in adult court, and do not award discretion to either courts or 
prosecutors. 
125. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: NATIONAL REPORT SERIES—TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 5 (2011), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf. This report notes that: 
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National Prosecution Standards established by the National District 
Attorney’s Association advise prosecutors to base transfer decisions on, 
among other factors, the gravity of the alleged offense and the juvenile’s 
“record of previous delinquent behavior,” without specifying whether 
the consideration of the child’s record should be limited to those charges 
for which he or she was found guilty.
126
 Because standards are scarce 
and there is no oversight or review of prosecutorial transfer decisions, 
prosecutors are free to consider arrests, dismissed charges, or even 
alleged behavior for which the juvenile was previously acquitted when 
determining whether a child should be tried in adult court.
127
 
2. Accusation Evidence and Judicial Discretion in Juvenile Transfer 
Decisions 
When judicial waiver laws control transfer decisions, judges 
determine whether a case should be transferred from juvenile to adult 
court,
128
 usually after a formal hearing.
129
 In Kent v. United States,
130
 the 
                                                     
[P]rosecutorial discretion laws are usually silent regarding standards, protocols, or appropriate 
considerations for decisionmaking. Even in those few states where statutes provide some 
general guidance to prosecutors, or at least require them to develop their own decision-making 
guidelines, there is no hearing, no evidentiary record, and no opportunity for defendants to test 
(or even to know) the basis for a prosecutor’s decision to proceed in criminal court. 
Id. 
126. NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-11.5 (2010). The 
National District Attorney’s Association National Prosecution Standards advise prosecutors, when 
deciding whether a charge against a juvenile should be adjudicated or subjected to diversion, to 
consider, among other factors, “[t]he nature and number of previous cases presented by law 
enforcement or others against the juvenile, and the disposition of those cases.” Id. § 4-11.6, at 65; 
see also Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The 
Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 437 (describing the fact 
that, “in most states, prosecutors make charging decisions with little guidance about whether and 
how to charge youth . . . . Moreover, prosecutors have published few internal standards to guide 
prosecutorial decisions at the juvenile intake and charging stage”). 
127. Victor L. Streib, Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Homicide Cases, 109 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1071, 1085 (2005) (noting that while “[p]rosecutors’ information about the crime is typically 
ample,” often little is known about the juvenile except for “his or her juvenile or criminal record”). 
128. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 2 (describing the three categories of transfer laws: 
“once adult/always adult” laws that mandate that once a child has been charged as an adult, he must 
always be charged as an adult in the future, “reverse waiver laws” that permit juveniles charged in 
adult court to seek removal to juvenile court, and “blended sentencing laws” that allow juvenile 
judges to impose adult sentences or criminal court judges to hand down juvenile sentences). 
129. Patrick Griffin, The Current State of Juvenile Transfer Law, with Some Recommendations 
for Reform, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY 15, 15–16 (2009) (writing that the laws “designate a class of 
cases in which juvenile courts may consider waiving jurisdiction, generally on the prosecutor’s 
motion. They prescribe broad standards to be applied, factors to be considered, and procedures to be 
followed in waiver decision-making, and require that prosecutors bear the burden of proving that 
waiver is appropriate”). This Article further describes the reduced importance of such laws as states 
increasingly rely on prosecutorial discretion, exclusion laws, and presumptive and mandatory 
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Supreme Court established procedural requirements that govern a 
judge’s decision to transfer a child to adult court, suggesting in an 
appendix to the opinion that courts consider “[t]he record and previous 
history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the Youth Aid 
Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other 
jurisdictions.”131 In addition, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
(FJDA) included consideration of “the extent and nature of the juvenile’s 
prior delinquency record” among the factors that federal courts should 
consider when making discretionary transfer determinations.
132
 
While there is a circuit split regarding whether the meaning of “prior 
delinquency record” in the FJDA is limited to prior convictions (referred 
to as “adjudications” in juvenile court),133 courts on either side of the 
split permit lower juvenile courts to rely on accusation evidence.
134
 Even 
courts which reject the use of conduct for which the child was not found 
guilty under the “prior delinquency record” standard (or decline to 
address that claim) nevertheless hold that judges may consider prior 
conduct that did not result in a conviction under one of the FJDA’s other 
six factors.
135
 There are thus multiple ways courts can rely on prior 
                                                     
waiver laws. 
130. 383 U.S. 541, 567 (1966). 
131. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 567 (1966). 
132. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012). 
133. For example, in United States v. Juvenile LWO, the Eighth Circuit held that the “plain 
language of the term ‘the juvenile’s prior delinquency record,’ would not encompass evidence of 
incidents or behavior which could be of a delinquent or criminal nature, for which there has been no 
charge or a charge but no conviction.” 160 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998). In contrast, in United 
States v. Wilson, the Seventh Circuit held that “the statute allows review of the delinquency record, 
which includes arrests as well as convictions.” 149 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1998). For a 
comprehensive discussion of judicial interpretation of the “prior delinquency record” factor, see, for 
example, Randie P. Ullman, Federal Juvenile Waiver Practices: A Contextual Approach to the 
Consideration of Prior Delinquency Records, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1329, 1353–58 (2000). 
134. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1999) (comparing the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ broader approach to accusation evidence with the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ “narrower definition” of accusation evidence). 
135. See id. at 1253–54. The court held that:  
Even if we limited Anthony Y.’s prior delinquency to the three adjudicated offenses, the 
additional conduct considered by the district court was relevant to several of the other statutory 
factors, like “the age and social background of the juvenile,” “the juvenile’s present intellectual 
development and psychological maturity,” or “the nature of past treatment efforts and the 
juvenile’s response to such efforts.” 
Id.; see also Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d at 1183 (holding that while courts cannot consider 
unadjudicated acts under the “prior delinquency record” factor, the “plain language” of three other 
factors—“the juvenile’s present intellectual and psychological maturity,” “the age and social 
background of the juvenile,” and the “nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to 
such efforts”—were “broad enough to authorize the admission of evidence regarding almost any 
action, criminal or otherwise, the juvenile has taken”).  
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accusations for which the child was not convicted when deciding if that 
child should be prosecuted in juvenile or adult court. 
State juvenile transfer statutes often incorporate the Kent factors 
wholesale or in large part,
136
 and many allow courts to consider prior 
accusations of criminal conduct that did not result in a conviction as part 
of the transfer decision.
137
 When the government bears the burden of 
proving that the child at issue should be tried as an adult, the standard of 
proof in state transfer hearings ranges from “clear and convincing 
evidence” to “preponderance of the evidence” to simply “substantial 
evidence.”138 
C. Accusation Evidence in Sentencing 
Shawn Towne was accused of assaulting, kidnapping, and threatening 
a man he had just met, then stealing the man’s car.139 He faced a 
multitude of serious charges at trial, including kidnapping and robbery, 
but was acquitted of all of them except for the lesser offense of 
joyriding. At sentencing, the judge imposed the maximum sentence for 
the joyriding conviction, finding that Mr. Towne’s behavior related to 
the kidnapping and robbery had frightened the victim. The appellate 
court upheld the trial court’s decision, reasoning that “the trial court’s 
consideration of conduct underlying counts of which the defendant has 
been acquitted is not inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal, 
because a lower standard of proof applies at sentencing.”140 
In United States v. Watts,
141
 the Supreme Court held that sentencing 
                                                     
136. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 4:3, at 250 (2013) (“[A] number of states 
have codified waiver criteria identical or very similar to those enumerated in Kent . . . . Others have 
fashioned criteria of their own that reflect the essential concerns of those suggested in Kent.”). 
137. For example, Florida law allows the court to consider “the record and previous history of the 
child, including . . . previous contacts with the department, the Department of Corrections, the 
former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Department of Children and Family, 
other law enforcement agencies, and courts.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.556(4)(c)(7)(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). Other state transfer statutes also permit judges to consider 
prior accusations that did not result in juvenile adjudications as part of the transfer determination. 
For example, in Michigan the court shall consider “the juvenile’s prior record of delinquency, 
including, but not limited to, any record of detention, any police record, any school record, or any 
other evidence indicating prior delinquent behavior.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2d (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
138. See DAVIS, supra note 136 (noting that, while “the state bears the burden of proof on the 
issue on nonamenability to treatment as a juvenile,” that standard of proof “differs from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction”). 
139. People v. Towne, 186 P.3d 10 (Cal. 2008). 
140. Id. at 24. 
141. 519 U.S. 148 (1997). 
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judges may consider criminal conduct for which the defendant was 
acquitted if the court finds that the conduct has been proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and such use does not violate the 
defendant’s constitutional due process rights.142 Many federal circuit 
courts have also held that judges can consider crimes for which the 
defendant was arrested but not convicted if the court is aware of 
sufficient underlying facts and the defendant does not contest the arrest 
during the sentencing hearing.
143
 Indeed, one such court stated that, even 
in the absence of such underlying facts, “there may be situations where 
the number of prior arrests, and/or the similarity of prior charges to the 
offense of conviction, becomes so overwhelming and suggestive of 
actual guilt that they become exceedingly difficult to ignore.”144 While 
the federal court may not consider a prior arrest record, standing alone, 
as justification for an upward departure from the sentencing range 
recommended by the Guidelines,
145
 federal sentencing law—as well as 
the law in many states
146—provides ample opportunity for courts to 
consider accusation evidence in sentencing. 
                                                     
142. Id. at 154–57 (1997) (holding that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the 
sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct 
has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence”). 
143. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 568 F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2009) (“To be clear, all 
that is precluded from consideration by § 4A1.3(a)(3) is a district court’s reliance ‘on bare reports of 
prior arrests.’ The facts underlying those arrests are fair game.” (citation omitted)); United States. v. 
Dixon, 318 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when 
it imposed an enhanced sentence based in part on four arrests for which there were sufficient 
underlying facts and when the defendant did not contest); United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1137, 
1141–42 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court did not rely on the defendant’s arrest record 
alone where the information was more in depth than a mere arrest record and the defendant did not 
question the reliability of the information). 
144. United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2009). 
145. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (2014); see, e.g., Berry, 553 F.3d at 
284 (“[A] bare arrest record—without more—does not justify an assumption that a defendant has 
committed other crimes and it therefore cannot support increasing his/her sentence in the absence of 
adequate proof of criminal activity.”); United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the court’s consideration of defendant’s prior arrests, especially when it did not find 
that he actually committed the offenses but merely commented that it “seemed unlikely that he 
would have been arrested wrongfully so many times,” was error); United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 
447 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that it is unreasonable for a court to enhance a sentence based 
on a single arrest, remote in time). 
146. See Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing, 76 
TENN. L. REV. 235 (2009) (providing an overview of the state courts that permit the use of acquitted 
conduct at sentencing). 
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D. Accusation Evidence Outside of the Courtroom 
Accusation evidence also plays a role in decisions that take place 
within the criminal justice system but outside of the criminal courtroom, 
during the charging and punishment phases of a criminal case. This 
Section will briefly discuss reliance on accusation evidence by 
prosecutors when making charging decisions, by parole officials 
deciding whether to revoke parole and judges determining whether to 
revoke probation, and by prison officials when making classification 
decisions. 
1. Accusation Evidence in Prosecutorial Charging Decisions 
Prosecutors have complete, and largely unreviewable,
147
 discretion in 
deciding whether to charge an accused person with a crime, and what 
criminal charges to bring if the prosecutor determines that prosecution is 
merited. In exercising this discretion, prosecutors are guided by 
standards such as those promulgated by the American Bar Association, 
the National District Attorney’s Association, the United States 
Attorney’s Manual, and state-level statutes. While all these resources 
require prosecutors to bring charges only when they believe that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction,
148
 they do not impose limits 
on the consideration of past conduct for which the accused person was 
not convicted. Rather, these standards encourage the prosecutor to 
consider a range of factors in exercising his or her discretion.
149
 These 
factors generally include consideration of the accused person’s criminal 
history,
150
 including conduct for which the person was not convicted.
151
 
                                                     
147. See, e.g., Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that 
prosecutors are accorded immunity from civil damages in a Section 1983 suit so long as they act 
within the scope of their “duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution”). 
148. See, e.g., NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 126 (“A prosecutor should file charges that 
he or she believes adequately encompass the accused’s criminal activity and which he or she 
reasonable believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.”). 
149 See, e.g., id. 
150. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 9-27.230 (1997) (“In determining 
whether prosecution should be declined because no substantial Federal interest would be served by 
prosecution, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant considerations, 
including: . . . (5) The person’s history with respect to criminal activity . . . .”); Leipold, supra note 
91, at 1330–31 (arguing that a prosecutor’s charging decisions may be influenced by the defendant’s 
prior arrests, and explaining that when a prosecutor is considering prior charges for which the 
defendant was not convicted, he or she “will often have an unbalanced file to consider: a detailed 
prosecution memo and indictment suggesting the validity of the prior charge, and a general verdict 
indicating that the suspect was found not guilty. A mistaken prior indictment can look just the same 
as a wholly justified one”). 
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2. Accusation Evidence in Probation and Parole Revocation 
Proceedings 
Robert Coughlin, while on probation for burglary and receipt of 
stolen property, was accused of committing another burglary.
152
 He went 
to trial on the new burglary charge and was acquitted. Later, at his 
probation revocation hearing, the judge considered the facts of the 
charge for which he was acquitted—including testimony from three of 
the trial witnesses—and revoked his probation, stating, “[t]he Court 
believes that he did participate in an attempted burglary . . . even though 
the evidence might not have been sufficient to convince the Court [in his 
criminal trial] beyond a reasonable doubt.”153 
A person on probation or parole can, like Mr. Coughlin, have his 
release revoked based on a criminal accusation for which he is not 
convicted. When a person is sentenced to probation, or is released from 
prison onto parole, the conditions of his release are certain to contain a 
requirement that he refrain from further criminal activity.
154
 Failure to 
adhere to this or any other term of his release can result in the initiation 
of parole or probation revocation proceedings.
155
 Parole and probation 
violations may be proven by preponderance of the evidence or another 
standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.
156
 Because the 
State’s failure to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
preclude a finding of guilt under the lower preponderance of the 
evidence standard, state and federal courts have long held that courts and 
parole officials may revoke a person’s probation or parole based on 
accusations of criminal acts for which he was not found guilty in the 
                                                     
151. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 137-095-0020 (2015) (instructing prosecutors to coordinate with 
“local, state and federal regulatory agencies” to obtain additional information about the defendant, 
including “the violator’s past record of compliance or noncompliance with the law”). 
152. In re Coughlin, 545 P.2d 249 (Cal. 1976). 
153. Id. at 250–51. 
154. See, e.g., CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 15, § 2512 (2015) (“General Conditions of Parole . . . . (4) 
Criminal Conduct. You shall not engage in criminal conduct. You shall immediately inform your 
parole agent if you are arrested for a felony or misdemeanor under federal, state, or county law.”). 
155. People facing the revocation of their parole or probation are entitled to minimal standards of 
due process in their revocation hearings. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) 
(establishing minimum due process standards for federal parole revocation hearings); Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (establishing minimum due process standards for federal probation 
revocation hearings). 
156. See 21A AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 856 (2013) (“The burden of proof in a probation-
revocation hearing is considerably lower than in a criminal case,” and further noting that “[t]he state 
bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a violation of probation, although proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not required. The state may prove a violation of probation by a preponderance 
of the evidence, reasonably satisfactory evidence, or by the greater weight of the evidence.”). 
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criminal justice system.
157
 It is not unusual, therefore, for a person on 
probation or parole to be charged with a new crime, have that case 
dismissed or be acquitted altogether, and nevertheless suffer revocation 
based on the crime for which he was not convicted.
158
 
3. Accusation Evidence in Prison Classification Procedures 
After a jury trial, Raymond Tinsley was convicted of murder but 
acquitted of sexual assault.
159
 Once he began serving his prison sentence, 
prison officials informed him that, despite the fact that he was acquitted 
of the sexual assault, he needed to complete sexual offender treatment 
based upon the description of his crime in his pre-sentence investigation 
report.
160
 
When a person is convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison, prison 
officials must determine what level of security he requires, what 
programs he must complete, what discretionary comforts he may 
receive, and a host of other conditions of his confinement. These 
decisions are driven by classification matrixes developed by the prisons, 
which require officials to evaluate the inmate based on a variety of 
factors related to his personal characteristics and history, such as his 
criminal background, age, and need for substance abuse treatment.
161
 
Prison officials can, as in Mr. Tinsley’s case, determine that an inmate 
has satisfied one or more of these factors based on a crime for which the 
inmate was never convicted. For example, prison officials routinely 
classify inmates as sexual offenders based on prior arrests for sexual 
offenses, dismissed sex offense charges, or even sexual assault charges 
                                                     
157. See, e.g., Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that “collateral 
estoppel does not bar a subsequent parole revocation hearing after a criminal acquittal” as “[t]he 
sanctions imposed and the burden of proof are different”); People v. Brown, 704 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88 
(App. Div. 2000) (holding that there is no “inherent contradiction between a determination that the 
defendant violated his probation and a verdict acquitting him of the criminal offenses which formed 
the basis of the violation”). 
158. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 91, at 1333 (stating that, in the context of parole or probation 
revocation hearings, “courts have found [that] the inability to determine the basis for the acquittal, 
coupled with the lower standard of proof in the revocation proceedings, mean that the acquittal has 
no preclusive or even probative value”). 
159.  Tinsley v. Goord, No. 05-civ-3921(NRB), 2006 WL 2707324 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006). 
160. Id. at *2. 
161. See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., INTERNAL PRISON CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN 
THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2002) (“Fueled by litigation and overcrowding, 
classification systems are viewed as the principal management tool for allocating scarce prison 
resources efficiently and minimizing the potential for violence or escape.”). 
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that resulted in acquittal.
162
 Prisons officials may also base a 
determination of the “severity” of the inmate’s crime of conviction 
based, not on the crime itself, but on the official’s evaluation of the 
inmate’s behavior as represented in police reports or other materials.163 
Prison officials may make such determinations either applying no 
standard of proof whatsoever, or after hearings in which officials apply 
standards of proof lower—generally much lower—than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
164
 
As we have seen, decision makers within the criminal justice system 
reconsider charges for which the defendant was not convicted in a 
variety of different circumstances. From the perspective of the decision 
maker considering accusation evidence—a judge deciding the 
appropriate length of a prison sentence, a prosecutor determining what 
charges to file against a newly arrested person—the fact that the 
defendant was not convicted of a prior crime does not preclude the 
possibility that he is factually guilty of committing it. And, if convinced 
that the defendant really committed the prior crime, the decision maker 
may look to that act as evidence that he is a violent person, or a liar, or 
more likely to be guilty of the new offense for which he is charged. 
Courts impose few procedural obstacles to the use of this evidence, apart 
from the requirement (not present in all circumstances) that the 
defendant’s culpability for the prior charge be established under a 
standard of proof lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The systemic reliance on accusation evidence is thus animated by the 
lingering uncertainty regarding the defendant’s culpability when he is 
charged but not convicted of a crime. As Part III explores further, our 
criminal justice system treats uncertainty about the defendant’s 
culpability very differently depending on whether or not he was 
convicted of the crime for which he was accused. 
III.  THE INCONSISTENCY OF UNCERTAINTY 
While there may be uncertainty about a defendant’s actual innocence 
when he is acquitted or when charges are dropped, there can be just as 
                                                     
162. See, e.g., Lindsey Webb, The Procedural Due Process Rights of the Stigmatized Prisoner, 
15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1055, 1062 (2013) (describing ways in which prisons classify inmates as 
sexual offenders based on crimes for which they were never convicted). 
163. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: INMATE SECURITY DESIGNATION AND 
CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION, ch. 4, 6–7 (2006).  
164. See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that before 
a prison can classify an inmate as a sex offender, he should be afforded a hearing in which the 
determination that he should be so classified is supported by “some evidence”). 
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much uncertainty about that defendant’s actual guilt if he is convicted. 
Once a person is convicted of a crime, however, a claim that the 
convicted person is factually innocent will not, by itself, serve as the 
basis for appellate or habeas review, and courts have upheld legal and 
policy approaches that hinder reconsideration of convictions based on 
innocence claims. If a person is charged with a crime and not convicted, 
on the other hand, ambiguity about whether he was actually guilty 
provides justification for decision makers throughout the system to 
review that prior outcome for a variety of purposes, seeking to establish 
the guilt for which he previously eluded justice. 
A. Examining the Role of Uncertainty Through the Lens of Finality 
Although it may be complicated to draw direct parallels between 
appellate and habeas review of convictions and the ways that decision 
makers review accusation evidence, the doctrine of finality provides a 
useful point of comparison. Proponents of finality cite the importance of 
respecting the process by which a criminal conviction is obtained and 
invoke a host of policy considerations for denying a convicted person 
habeas relief even when questions regarding the petitioner’s innocence 
or the constitutionality of his arrest and prosecution remain. This 
argument, while originating in academic articles, is no theoretical 
exercise; courts have, for example, denied DNA tests to convicted 
persons with innocence claims based on the principles of finality.
165
 
This Article does not seek to champion finality, which has been 
sharply criticized by a multitude of critics for the ways in which its 
application has resulted in the disregard of claims of innocence and of 
claims of constitutional error on habeas review.
166
 Rather, it uses finality 
as a lens to examine and contrast the criminal justice system’s eagerness 
to cease reconsideration of the outcome of criminal convictions with its 
willingness to eternally reconsider cases that resulted in dismissal or 
acquittal. To this end, it seeks to highlight the significant role that policy 
considerations play in the systemic limitation of the review of 
convictions and to note the absence of such considerations when courts 
                                                     
165. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 102 (2009) (holding that state defendant 
has no constitutional right to access to the government’s evidence so that it can be subjected to 
DNA testing); see also Kristen McIntyre, A Prisoner’s Right to Access DNA Evidence to Prove His 
Innocence: Post-Osborne Options, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 565, 571–73 (2011) (discussing the 
facts of Osborne). 
166. See, e.g., Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 
356 (2010) (discussing the arguments for finality and the impacts of those arguments on habeas 
review). 
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review challenges to the use of accusation evidence. 
Allegiance to finality began its ascent five decades ago, when 
Professor Paul Bator
167
 and Judge Henry J. Friendly
168—the fathers of 
finality—advanced arguments for that principle which, despite a lack of 
empirical support,
169
 triggered significant judicial and legislative 
changes to habeas corpus procedures. Both Bator and Friendly 
emphasized the importance of respecting the process by which a 
conviction is obtained, and argued that if a lower court has provided the 
defendant with process that is meaningful and just, our society should 
decline to endlessly repeat that process in search of possible errors.
170
 If 
the convicted person had what Bator described as “a fair chance”171 and 
Friendly as a “fair opportunity”172 to litigate his claims at the trial and 
appellate level, the system must be willing to tolerate some measure of 
uncertainty about the accuracy of its own processes.
173
 In Bator’s words, 
at some point it is essential for a judicial system to conclude that, despite 
the possibility of error, “we have tried hard enough and thus may take it 
that justice has been done.”174 Courts applying the doctrine of finality 
are willing to live with some level of uncertainty—even a substantial 
level of uncertainty—about whether constitutional or factual error 
occurred in a particular case in the greater interest of ending 
consideration of the case altogether. 
Further, the doctrine of finality rests on the reasoning that, while 
uncertainty is inherent to a human system of justice, there are values that 
                                                     
167. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).  
168. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970). 
169. Andrew C. Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further 
the “Interest of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 575 (critiquing advocates of finality who, while 
arguing for restrictions on review, fail to identify what specific benefits the restriction would 
advance or how such benefits would be obtained). 
170. Bator did not seek to eradicate all appellate review; he felt that such review had value in 
checking the possibility of “error, oversight, arbitrariness and even venality in any human 
institution,” in addition to providing an opportunity for higher courts to articulate precedent that 
could help assure that the law was uniformly applied. Bator, supra note 167, at 453. His focus 
instead was on what limits might be imposed on state prisoners seeking review under the federal 
writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 443.  
171. Id. at 456; see also BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 4.1–4.9 (2014).  
172. Friendly, supra note 168, at 149–50. 
173. Even state and federal appellate courts, Bator pointed out, do not generally re-litigate the 
underlying facts of a case, although factual error may have occurred, instead focusing on the lower 
court’s application of the law. Bator, supra note 167, at 454. 
174. Id. at 452. 
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trump the judicial system’s continued pursuit of that uncertainty. Bator, 
followed by Friendly, argued that a variety of policy considerations, 
including conserving resources, preserving the high quality of decision-
making at the trial court level, aiding in the rehabilitation of the 
defendant, deterring criminal activity, preserving public confidence in 
the criminal justice system, reducing decision-making based on aging or 
lost evidence, and satisfying the human need for “repose,” provide 
justifications for ending reconsideration of a criminal conviction.
175
 
Scholars and courts frequently cite these considerations in support of the 
finality of convictions.
176
 Yet courts have not invoked them as reasons to 
limit the reconsideration of prior accusations, although many of these 
policy concerns have applicability to the reconsideration of criminal 
charges for which no conviction was obtained. 
For example, courts frequently cite the economic expense of collateral 
attacks on convictions as a justification for limiting access to habeas 
corpus review.
177
 But the use of accusation evidence can require the 
same “resources of the community—judges, prosecutors, and attorneys 
appointed to aid the accused, and . . . courtrooms” that Judge Friendly 
argued merited against collateral review of convictions.
178
 A parole 
revocation hearing based on a crime for which the parolee was acquitted 
may involve a complete reconsideration of the very same evidence—
including live testimony from the trial witnesses—that was introduced at 
the trial level. A judge considering whether to allow the government to 
introduce evidence at trial of a prior crime for which the defendant was 
not convicted may review the police reports, trial testimony, or other 
documents from the alleged offense, listen to arguments from the 
prosecution and defense, or even require a hearing with live testimony 
before making her ruling. If the court decides to allow the prosecution to 
admit this evidence, the government will then present witnesses and 
physical evidence at trial regarding the prior alleged offense. All these 
efforts are costly, both in terms of resources and time. 
Another justification for finality in the context of habeas review is the 
argument that when collateral attacks on a criminal conviction take place 
                                                     
175. See Friendly, supra note 168, and Bator, supra note 167. 
176. See Kim, supra note 169, at 572 (noting that the Bator and Friendly articles have “been cited 
in hundreds of law review articles and court opinions,” and “the interests of finality have been 
treated as ‘paramountly important’ in the dozens of Supreme Court opinions that cite these articles 
by name”).   
177. See id. at 578 (describing “finality” as “a shorthand used to refer to a collection of societal 
interests—primarily conservation of resources, efficient defense counsel behavior, and deterrence—
that scholars assume are furthered by any restrictions on review”). 
178. Friendly, supra note 168, at 148. 
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long after the crime and investigation occurred, the evidence upon which 
the conviction was based will necessarily have eroded, jeopardizing the 
accuracy of the review process.
179
 Similarly, decision makers relying on 
accusation evidence, such as judges making juvenile transfer decisions 
or prosecutors seeking to cast doubt on the credibility of a witness, may 
also base these efforts on arrest reports, witness testimony, and other 
evidence from many years in the past. Some decisions based on 
accusation evidence, such as prosecutorial charging decisions or some 
prison classification determinations, occur in completely unreviewable 
and private settings, raising even greater concerns about reliance on 
evidence that has been damaged or lost due to the passage of time. The 
use of accusation evidence thus raises the same concerns about the 
accuracy of decision-making raised by proponents of finality of 
convictions in the habeas context.
180
 
Proponents of finality also argue that because appellate courts are no 
better equipped than the trial court to evaluate the facts and law of the 
case, review by such courts does little to advance the search for truth and 
much to damage the system of justice. Again, whether or not that 
position is accurate, there is no reason to believe that the parties 
evaluating accusation evidence are in any way better positioned to 
evaluate that case than were the parties to its original prosecution. 
Indeed, in many ways these secondary evaluators are in a far weaker 
position than the original parties. They may base their decisions on 
police or probation reports rather than live testimony, and, as noted 
above, significant time may have passed since the original prosecution, 
possibly resulting in lost or weakened evidence. Further, the procedures 
by which the decision makers conduct these re-evaluations are not 
governed by rigorous procedural due process protections. 
Moreover, the apprehension, advanced by proponents of finality, that 
reconsideration of criminal convictions may damage the public trust in 
the criminal justice system also applies to the system’s reliance on 
accusation evidence. As Judge Friendly wrote, “it is difficult to urge 
public respect for the judgments of criminal courts in one breath and to 
countenance free reopening of them in the next.”181 When decision 
                                                     
179. Id. at 147 (“The longer the delay, the less the reliability of the determination of any factual 
issue giving rise to the attack.”). 
180. Wayne R. LaFave et al., Balancing Within the Statutory Framework, in 7 CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 28.2(c) (3d ed. 2014) (noting the concern that “expansive federal review of state 
court decisions” may undermine accuracy “because habeas review often does not take place for 
several years, relief may mean the state no longer has access to the evidence it may need to retry the 
case”). 
181. Friendly, supra note 168, at 149; see also John N. Mitchell, Attorney Gen. of the United 
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makers in the criminal justice system rely on accusation evidence, they 
are revisiting the conclusion of a case just as surely as does an appellate 
court that reviews a criminal conviction. The use of accusation evidence, 
which calls into question the accuracy and fairness of the outcomes of 
criminal cases, may, like ongoing appeals of convictions, lead the public 
to doubt the criminal justice system. 
Finally, advocates of finality cite the human need for “repose,” 
arguing for the need to address the psychological
182
 effect that continual 
collateral attacks on convictions have on both participants in the criminal 
justice system and society as a whole. Bator argued that a continual 
reexamination of criminal convictions “no longer reflects humane 
concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility,”183 and Friendly 
described repose as the “human desire that things must sometime come 
to an end.”184 When actors in the criminal justice reconsider accusation 
evidence, that reconsideration also subverts the value of repose by 
allowing continual reconsideration of criminal charges for which a 
conviction was not obtained. When judges base juvenile transfer 
decisions on charges for which the child was not adjudicated, for 
example, they are reconsidering a prior outcome and replacing it with 
their own determination of culpability. This reconsideration is informed 
by the same anxiety that troubled Bator: the fear that the criminal justice 
system may have erred in the past and anxiety that such error will go 
uncorrected if it is not continually reexamined.
185
 This continual 
revisiting of the conclusions of the criminal justice system, be they 
convictions, acquittals, or dismissals, are surely equally troubling to our 
social need for repose. 
The criminal justice system’s allegiance to the values of finality over 
the nagging concern that the outcome of the criminal case was erroneous 
applies only to the appeal of convictions. Yet the analysis above 
                                                     
States, Address Before the Alabama State Bar Association: “Restoring the Finality of Justice” (June 
25, 1971), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/06-25-
1971.pdf (agreeing with Friendly’s concern that repetitive habeas appeals undermine “the respect 
for law,” commenting, “[d]o we not demonstrate a certain lack of confidence in our legal processes 
if we must keep avenues open for endless redetermination of questions long ago passed upon by 
competent judicial tribunals?”). 
182. Bator, supra note 167, at 452 (“Repose is a psychological necessity in a secure and active 
society . . . .”). 
183. Id. at 452–53. 
184. Friendly, supra note 168, at 149.  
185. See Bator, supra note 167, at 443 (describing this anxiety as “the impulse . . . to make 
doubly, triply, even ultimately sure that the particular judgment is just, that the facts as found are 
‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct’”). 
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demonstrates that many of the arguments for finality—for a time when 
the system must stop reconsidering the decisions it has made before, for 
the purported good of society, the defendant, and the justice system 
itself—apply equally as powerfully to the reconsideration of charges for 
which the defendant was prosecuted but for which a conviction was not 
obtained. The fact that the principles of finality have been invoked to 
impose limits on the habeas review of convictions and not to the 
reconsideration of charges for which the State failed to achieve a 
conviction at first seems puzzling. It becomes less so when the 
inconsistency is understood as furthering the same underlying goal: the 
preservation of guilt. 
IV.  THE PRESERVATION OF GUILT 
Our system of criminal justice seeks guilt; once guilt is obtained, it 
aims to preserve it; and if guilt is eluded, it will pursue it. The system 
tolerates a risk of wrongful conviction in the process by which guilty 
pleas and even guilty verdicts are obtained, and yet imposes significant 
hurdles to raising post-conviction questions of innocence. When the 
State fails to obtain a conviction, on the other hand, the possibility that 
the defendant might be guilty drives decision makers within the system 
to reconsider the unproven accusation for a wide variety of purposes. 
The justice system’s level of comfort with certainty and uncertainty 
about a defendant’s culpability shifts depending on whether or not the 
defendant was convicted of the crime. 
This difference cannot be explained by, for example, asserting that the 
system simply honors proof beyond a reasonable doubt above all else, 
because the system seeks to preserve convictions even when (as in most 
cases) they were obtained through a guilty plea instead of through a trial. 
Similarly, it cannot be satisfactorily explained as a manifestation of the 
search for truth, as courts of appeal seem unwilling or unable to engage 
in the truth-seeking process when questions of culpability arise post-
conviction. And, as we have seen, even assuming that the arguments for 
finality have inherent merit, they do not provide a meaningful 
justification for the outcome-specific differences in our system’s 
reaction to uncertainty. 
Uncertainty about the defendant’s culpability after a conviction does 
not trigger meaningful appellate review. But uncertainty about the 
defendant’s culpability after an acquittal or dismissal of charges is the 
basis for endless reconsideration of the unproven charges. This 
discrepancy reveals a deep bias in our system of justice towards the 
preservation of guilt. The pursuit of guilt as a value unto itself distorts 
our system of justice. 
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A. The Ramifications of a Systemic Allegiance to Guilt 
There are both individual and systemic consequences to our system’s 
focus on guilt. Individual lives are damaged or destroyed when innocent 
people are convicted and punished for crimes they did not commit.
186
 A 
system of criminal justice that tolerates the risk of wrongful conviction 
(and, indeed, sets up barriers to appellate review that might serve to 
lessen that risk) risks erosion of its moral authority.
187
 Society may grow 
increasingly skeptical of the justice system’s ability to make meaningful 
determinations of guilt and innocence, particularly as cases of wrongful 
conviction become increasingly well-documented.
188
 While proponents 
of finality fear that review of criminal convictions will reduce the 
public’s confidence in the criminal justice system, the system’s failure to 
identify and rectify cases where innocent people have been convicted 
risks even greater damage to that trust. 
When a decision maker relies on accusation evidence, the 
consequences to the accused person can be severe, including increased 
prison sentences, revoked parole and a return to incarceration, the 
transfer of children to adult court, and classification of an inmate as a 
sex offender in prison. There are also larger social ramifications to the 
system’s willingness to allow decision makers to salvage findings of 
guilt from cases where guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The use of accusation evidence arguably runs counter to our systemic 
allegiance to the presumption of innocence and the government’s burden 
to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When decision 
makers rely on accusation evidence, they rely on proof that falls far 
below that required for a criminal conviction; indeed, in some contexts 
mere suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is enough to establish culpability 
of the prior crime.
189
 While the fact that a person was not convicted of a 
                                                     
186. See Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and Justice Is 
Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 138 (describing a New York Times study of 
137 former prisoners who had been exonerated through DNA evidence; the study revealed that 
many of the exonerees suffered from mental health issues related to their wrongful incarceration and 
faced significant challenges in securing employment, medical care, and creating or maintaining 
family relationships and other social ties following their release from prison). 
187. See Charles I. Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas Corpus and Justice, 
12 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 233, 234 (2002) (asking “if the criminal justice system is divorced 
from morality on something as basic as punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, has it lost 
its moral authority and legitimacy?”). 
188. See Innocent People in Prison, supra note 12 (compiling media coverage of wrongful 
convictions). 
189. As discussed in Part II, supra, prosecutors may rely on accusation evidence in making 
charging decisions and prison officials often may rely on accusation evidence in making prison 
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crime does not necessarily mean that he is innocent of wrongdoing, 
reliance on accusation evidence demonstrates that, even if a person 
accused of a crime is acquitted or the charges against him are dismissed, 
the system harbors suspicions or even presumptions that his true guilt 
will be revealed if decision makers are simply given enough 
opportunities and a low enough standard of proof.
190
 
Further, our criminal justice system provides no avenue by which a 
person, once charged with a crime, can obtain definitive proof that he 
was not culpable of the crime of which he is accused.
191
 This fact, 
combined with the low (or nonexistent) standards of proof applied to the 
review of accusation evidence, supports a view of a justice system that 
fails to provide defendants with a means by which their culpability can 
be disproven, and then penalizes the accused person for this fact by 
eternally reconsidering accusations for which he was not convicted so 
long as it has jurisdiction over him. The use of accusation evidence thus 
illuminates a troubling pattern: The system distrusts its own processes 
when they fail to result in a conviction, is unwilling to live with the 
uncertainty associated with an acquittal or dismissal (such that such 
outcomes may be eternally reconsidered), and simultaneously fails to 
provide procedures by which that uncertainty could be reduced or 
eliminated. Although the use of such evidence may be justified as 
furthering the search for truth, it also illuminates a systemic belief that 
guilt should be preserved so long as any suspicion of culpability 
remains. Again, such a perspective arguably undermines the principles 
of the presumption of innocence and the government’s burden to prove 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, thus sending a message 
to juries and the community that such principles are derided by the very 
system that purports to exalt them. 
Public concern for such outcomes may be muted by a variety of 
factors, including the fact that they can occur in settings with little to no 
review (as in the case of prosecutorial decision-making, parole 
revocation hearings, and prison classification determinations), the fact 
that the use of accusation evidence is not always obvious to an observer 
                                                     
classification decisions without applying any particular burden of proof to that evidence. 
190. It is worth noting that decision makers reviewing accusation evidence are generally looking 
solely at the question of whether the accused person was factually guilty of the crime or crimes of 
which he was accused and not convicted, and thus ignore questions about whether the evidence 
against him was unconstitutionally obtained.  
191. See Leipold, supra note 91, at 1299 (“[A] factually innocent defendant confronts the 
problem of being publicly accused by the government of criminal behavior with no real prospect of 
ever being officially vindicated.”). 
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(as in a trial setting where facts about a prior crime are elicited without 
revealing that the defendant had been acquitted of that crime), and there 
is no movement akin to the “innocence movement” seeking to rectify the 
use of accusation evidence. Indeed, many might take the view, espoused 
by so many courts, that just because a person escaped conviction for a 
crime does not mean that he is not culpable of committing it, and thus 
revisiting that offense in different circumstances evokes no particular 
alarm. Systemic reliance on accusation evidence is thus not easily 
detected; it take place in a variety of complex circumstances, some of 
which are not public, with consequences that may not be as easily 
understood as unjust as is a wrongful conviction. 
B. Dismantling the Allegiance to Guilt 
Our criminal justice system is based on high ideals—the search for 
truth, the punishment of the guilty, the exoneration of the falsely 
accused—but its focus on the pursuit and preservation of guilt has 
distorted those principles. Determining how to dismantle the allegiance 
to guilt is an enormous undertaking, however, as that allegiance is 
interwoven throughout the system in a range of complicated ways. 
Efforts to shift the system’s primary focus from attaining and preserving 
findings of guilt to the pursuit of truth fall into two broad categories: (a) 
reforms that seek to increase the accuracy of the process by which 
convictions, acquittals, and dismissals are obtained, and (b) reforms that 
seek to improve the ability of review bodies to determine whether the 
outcome of a criminal case accurately reflected the defendant’s 
culpability. 
The legal and academic community has paid significant attention to 
the question of improving the accuracy of the process by which 
convictions, acquittals, and dismissals are obtained. Many have 
suggested changes to the investigative process that would reduce the risk 
of wrongful convictions, such as taping law enforcement interrogations 
or adopting better practices for eyewitness identifications.
192
 
Commentators have called for courts to apply stricter restrictions on the 
use of the types of evidence that is primarily responsible for wrongful 
convictions, eyewitness identification chief among them.
193
 Observers 
                                                     
192. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 16, at 122 (describing research that suggests that reforms such 
as “videotaping interrogations, conducting double-blind and sequential eyewitness identifications, 
and implementing oversight of forensic crime laboratories” could better ensure the accuracy of 
criminal convictions, and noting that many jurisdictions have adopted these reforms in whole or in 
part). 
193. Shay, supra note 46, at 1506 (arguing that trial courts should be particularly mindful of cases 
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have argued for jury instructions that would provide greater guidance for 
factfinders as they evaluate such evidence.
194
 Scholars and others have 
suggested increased funding to both defense counsel and law 
enforcement to conduct a more robust factual investigation prior to 
trial.
195
 
Some have also suggested reforms designed to reduce the uncertainty 
about the defendant’s guilt associated with acquittals or dismissals, such 
as new verdict structures
196
 or creating procedures that would allow 
wrongfully convicted persons an opportunity to seek a civil or other 
judgment declaring their innocence.
197
 Others have suggested 
specialized procedures for convicted defendants who assert their 
innocence,
198
 such as allowing people accused of crimes to choose 
between having their case tried in traditional courts or in an alternative 
“innocence track.”199 
Another approach is to improve the accuracy of the process by which 
convictions are reviewed. One idea, already in practice in some states, is 
the creation of “Innocence Commissions” that serve to review 
convictions where actual innocence is at issue.
200
 Some have called for 
                                                     
based on the testimony of a single eye-witness, and in such cases should carefully ensure that the 
investigation, representation, jury instructions and other procedural protections are scrupulously 
observed); see, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
615; Robert Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer”: Evaluating State Safeguards Against 
Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1301 (2011) (reviewing state-level criminal justice reforms 
designed to prevent or remedy wrongful convictions). 
194. See, e.g., David. E. Aaronson, Cross-Racial Identification of Defendants in Criminal Cases: 
A Proposed Model Jury Instruction, 23 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2008). 
195. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 16, at 126 (noting that courts may face difficulties in 
identifying and rectifying claims of actual innocence when the factual record was not fully 
developed at trial, in part because of resource restraints). 
196. Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 
1305–06 (2005) (proposing a third verdict of “not proven”). 
197. Frederick Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgments to Vindicate the 
Wrongly Convicted, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 391, 397 (2009) (proposing “that persons wrongfully 
accused of criminal acts have a right to sue for a declaration of innocence”); see also Leipold, supra 
note 91, at 1300 (“If a defendant is acquitted in a bench trial, or if the charges are dismissed prior to 
trial, the defendant should be permitted to ask the judge for a finding that, not only has the 
government failed to prove guilt, but also that the evidence shows his innocence.”). 
198. See Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the 
Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547 (2008); Keith A. Findley, Adversarial 
Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for Truth, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 913 (2011) (suggesting a 
system in which lawyers act as defense lawyers and prosecutors in turn, and “share in guiding the 
inquisitorial process of investigating the case and developing the evidence”). 
199. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking 
Innocence into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 893 (2011). 
200. Garrett, supra note 16, at 127. 
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appellate courts to actively reconsider the factual determinations made at 
the trial level,
201
 to allow appellants to introduce new facts on direct 
appeal,
202
 or to reconsider their reliance on the doctrine of harmless 
error.
203
 Many have called for reforms of the procedural hurdles that 
limit the ability of convicted people, including those raising claims of 
actual innocence, to seek meaningful habeas review.
204
 These include 
suggestions for creating an exception to statutes of limitation when the 
prisoner’s claim is based on newly discovered evidence205 or asserts 
innocence,
206
 as well as arguments that habeas courts should recognize a 
freestanding constitutional claim of actual innocence.
207
 Some scholars 
have suggested solutions that would allow post-conviction courts to 
consider appellate claims as a whole rather than in a “piecemeal” fashion 
over a series of courts and a long period of time.
208
 Others have argued 
that inmates should receive the assistance of attorneys on post-
conviction review.
209
 
There has been little direct attention paid, however, to reforming the 
ways in which decision makers review accusation evidence.
210
 There 
                                                     
201. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 308–22. 
202. Findley, supra note 15, at 609 (arguing for a procedure by which a convicted person can 
introduce new facts on appeal).  
203. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should 
Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1995) (arguing that “each time we 
employ the imaginary tonic of harmless error, we erode an important legal principle. When we hold 
errors harmless, the rights of individuals, both constitutional and otherwise, go unenforced”). 
204. Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008). 
205. See Medwed, supra note 65, at 691–92 (arguing that “[a]t its core, the enforcement of 
statutes of limitations that begin to run as of the date of conviction fundamentally impedes the 
presentation of innocence claims given that the new evidence may not even be discoverable prior to 
the expiration of the limitations period”). 
206. See, e.g., Limin Zheng, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations 
Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2101, 2129 (2002); see 
also Case Comment, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996—Actual Innocence 
Gateway—McQuiggin v. Perkins, 127 HARV. L. REV. 318, 327 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s 2012 ruling in McQuiggin v. Perkins “removed a procedural barrier to habeas relief for 
those petitioners who can demonstrate their actual innocence”). 
207. See Leventhal, supra note 56 (reviewing federal and state court considerations of claims of 
actual innocence raised on habeas review). 
208. See Hartung, supra note 66, at 107 (suggesting that “when faced with a colorable claim of 
actual innocence, supported by a series of piecemeal claims raised individually, a court should 
expand the record in order to view the ‘evidence as a whole’”); see also Phillip G. Cormier et al., 
Federal Habeas Corpus and Actual Innocence, NAT’L L.J., May 2011, at 34, 34. 
209. See Kim, supra note 169, at 606 (arguing that prisoners would have greater success in their 
habeas petitions if they were represented by counsel). 
210. Some of these suggestions discussed above, if adopted, might transform the justice system’s 
 
14 - Webb.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:09 PM 
2015] THE IMMORTAL ACCUSATION 1899 
 
have been suggestions for change focused on specific uses of such 
evidence; for example, lawyers have raised legal challenges to the 
reliance on accusation evidence in a wide variety of contexts, and legal 
academics have strongly criticized the many forms in which this reliance 
is manifested. But there has been no argument critiquing the systemic 
use of accusation evidence—the ways in which the consideration of 
allegations of criminal wrongdoing for which the defendant was not 
convicted are interwoven into the routine functioning of the criminal 
justice system—or suggesting a broad approach to addressing this broad 
reliance on unproven accusations. 
Suggestions for dismantling the systemic reliance on accusation 
evidence could take a variety of forms. If courts were seeking ways to 
permit the use of accusation evidence, they might revisit their rejection 
of due process claims and propose increased procedural protections 
aimed at prioritizing the search for truth over the pursuit of guilt. 
Solutions might include a blanket prohibition on the use of acquittals 
with the imposition of a balancing test applied to use of dismissed 
charges, on the theory that dismissals have a wider range of motivations 
than acquittals and jury verdicts should be given greater deference than 
individual prosecutorial decision-making. Courts might also require the 
application of a uniform standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt 
to all uses of accusation evidence—again, eliminating reliance on jury 
acquittals, which already reflect the State’s failure to meet this standard. 
Courts could impose a presumption against the use of accusation 
evidence that could only be overcome by meeting particular criteria. 
Courts could simply disapprove of reliance on accusation evidence 
across the board, perhaps by relying on principles of finality, and 
perhaps also accompanied by reforms to the processes of sealing or 
expunging criminal accusations for which the State failed to obtain a 
conviction. 
There are strengths and weaknesses to these theoretical approaches to 
reform, and obvious doubts about the likelihood of these or any other 
changes to the use of accusation evidence taking place at all. Exploring 
the ramifications of these various approaches is a project for another 
time. This Article seeks instead to identify the reason why reform is 
needed. Reform will have its greatest impact if it is motivated, not just 
by a piecemeal approach to individual injustices, but by a holistic 
                                                     
approach to the use of accusation evidence. Courts might, for example, be less sympathetic to the 
reconsideration of a charge that resulted in an acquittal if that acquittal was viewed as a reflection of 
actual innocence instead of merely the government’s failure to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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attempt to dismantle our criminal justice system’s allegiance to guilt. By 
juxtaposing the system’s reliance on accusation evidence with its focus 
on obtaining and preserving convictions, we have the opportunity, and 
the responsibility, to take a hard look at the primary allegiance to guilt 
that currently shapes our criminal justice system. We have an 
opportunity, and a responsibility, to ask who this allegiance to guilt 
benefits, and who it harms, and why. And we have the opportunity, and 
the responsibility, to define the principles that should animate our 
criminal justice system and ensure that those principles are reflected in 
the practice and policy of our criminal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Our system of criminal justice is a system dedicated to attaining and 
preserving guilt. This dedication warps the principles for which the 
justice system is generally understood to stand, such as the punishment 
of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent. Instead, our justice 
system is structured to ignore uncertainty about the factual culpability of 
a person who has been convicted, but to presume uncertainty about the 
factual innocence of a person who has been acquitted. It is structured so 
that a convicted person with a viable claim of innocence may be put to 
death, while unproven accusations of criminal conduct have eternal life. 
By dismantling the criminal justice system’s dedication to guilt, we may 
instead create a system focused not on enduring accusations, but on 
lasting justice. 
 
